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PREFACE
This monograph is intended to present the results and conclusion~ of an investigation of the federal policy of confiscation during the Civil \Yar, undertaken as a doctoral dissertation for the
Department of History in the University of Chicago. Though the
nature of such a study is sufficiently clear without introductory
comments, and though its importanre may not justify an extended
preface, yet a word of explanation may perhaps be in order as to
the choice of subject matter and the method pursued in this short
volume. The writer has. for the purpose of unity of treatment,
excluded various topics which are plainly related to the subject of
confiscation during the Civil \Var. The important, though undevelopecl, subject of rebel sequestration, for instance, has been
referred to only incidentally as throwing light on the motives for
the Union measures of forfeiture. A unique class of ·'property",
namely slaves, is excluded from consideration here, because the
study of this topic constitutes a substantial problem in itself, and its
connection with the policy of general confiscation was only incidental. :Mere military seizures, pursued in accordance with the
general army instructions from \Yashington, fall outside the scope
of the present study, as do also forfeiture for Yiolation of the nonintercourse acts, seizures for evasion of the internal rel'enue. and
the capture and disposition of maritime prize~. These omissions
have been necessary in order to preserve the minuteness of subject
matter appropriate to monograph treatment.
The method of presentation pursued throughout the study is
to classify the data regarding seizures under general heads according to the principal kinds of situations in which property might
be placed, and to present the main problems or lines of policy which
the government followed in taking. trying. and restoring property,
rather than to explore the details of individual cases, though considerable material of this sort is in the writer's possession derived
from the original court records. ~lore space has intentionally
been given to the constitutional and legal phases of the subject,
than to economic and social considerations. The writer's justification for this empha~i~ is the highly important bearing of the confiscation question upon the larger constitutional problems of the
(iii)
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Civil \Var, about which much remains still to be written. The study
in its present form represents the results of frequent revisions,
which doubtless give a tone of severe condensation, but it is hoped
that, whatever graces of style may have been sacrificed, clearness
has at least been maintained.
The sources used are indicated in the section on bibliography
and in the footnotes. Besides published documents, statutes,
debates, decisions. and records, the writer has had access to such
unpublished material as the federal district court records, the files
of the Attorney-General's office, and of the Treasury Department.
and the captured records of the Confederacy. The author's chief
acknowledgments are clue to Professor C. H. \'an Tyne, of the
University of 1Iichigan. with whose valuable help the work was
begun as a seminary stt.dy, to Professor I\. C. McLaughlin, of the
University of Chicago, whose suggestions and comments on the first
draft of the manuscript have been of the greatest assistance. and
to the various officers at \Vashington to whom application was
made for the privilege of examining the archives. Particular
acknowledgment in this connection is due to the kindness of the
officials of the ::\Iiscellaneous Division of the Treasury Department. It should be noted at this point that portions of the dissertation have been published in the American Historical Review, 111
the number for October, 1912.
JAl\IES G. RANDALL.
Salem, Virginia,
February 19, 1913.
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THE LEGISLATIVE POLICY OF CONFISCATION

TnE annals of the Civil \Var furnish many instances of the use
of extreme methods in crippling an enemy. To those who approach
the study of this period after an interval of a half century certain
of the measures employed on both sides seem to be clearly outside
the limits prescribed in civilized warfare, while other measures
appear to occupy the borderland between what is forbidden and
what is allowed. To the latter class belong the acts by whirh the
Union go,ernment confiscated the private property of those who
adhered to the Confederate cause. The employment of a similar
measure by one of the great nations today would be generally condenmed, and grave doubts were raised at the time as to the justice
of such a policy.
Our concern in the succeeding pages will be to see how the
confiscation policy developed after a long and trying Congressional
struggle, to observe the extent of friction and annoyance causecl
by the enforcement of the acts, and to examine the problems of
legal interpretation with which the judges of the period labored.
Besides the Confiscation Acts proper we shall take into view yarious forfeitures in which, under other names and forms, essentially
similar principles with reference to the treatment of property were
applied. In the administration of the direct tax in the South, for
· instance, a form of forfeiture was adopted which amounted, virtually, to confiscation. The same was true of the collection of captured cotton by the treasury officials, and the administration of
abandoned estates which fell into Union possession. These forms
of seizure will claim our attention then, as representing 1•irt11al
confiscation. Our inquiry extends also to the final disposition of
the property, as well as its original forfeiture, and this involves
a study of the yarious methods of restoration which were adopted
after the war.
To trace the policy of confiscation to its origin would perhaps be
impo!>sible since it arose from widely scattered sources, but the
earliest official suggestion looking to the forfeiture of "rebel"
property seems to have been that of Secretary of the Treasury
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Chase, who, in 1861,1 before the matter came up in Congress, urged
the financial advantages of confiscation. A formidable array of
petitions received in Congress from loyal citizens in various parts
of the ?\'orth and eren of the South during the year 1861-1862
indicates that the subject had attracted a lively attention throughout
the country. 2 But a factor of far more influence was the action of
the Con federate government in sequestering northern debts. A Confederate statute of ~lay 21. 1861. forbade the payment of debts clue
to northern individuals or corporations, authorizing their payment
into the Confederate treasury, and an act of August 30 provided
for the sequestration of the property of '·aliens", by which term
was meant all those adhering to the Union cause.3 In view of these
acts it was urged in Congress that, aside from the general question
of the justice of confiscation, a s\\'eeping measure of forfeiture had
practically been forced upon the l,'nion government by the action
of the enemy.
The first confiscation law. a measure of limited scope, applying
oniy to property ( including slaves) actually employed in the aid of
insurrection, was introduced in the first session of the ThirtySeventh Congress in the summer of 1861.{ It was urged by such
radical leadership as that of Thaddeus Stevem of Pennsylvania,°
considerer! with as much deliberation as the crowded business of
this short session would allow. and became a law on August 6. So
far as the pure principle of confiscation was concerned. these debates
were unimportant. The absorption of Congress in more pressing
matters, and the introduction of the amendment regarding slaves
pre\'ented a full discussion of the constitutional and legal merits of
the confiscation question. Indeed it was only in the Ilouse of Representatives. and there but briefly, that the real issue of confiscation
wa<; debated at all. \\'e must look therefore to the next session of
'Finance ReJ)ort, 1861, pp. 12-13.
'During the month from April 1 to J\lay 1, 1862, the following petitions
regarding confiscation were recel\·ed in the House: from Citizens of Wisconsin
( House Journetl, 37 Cong., 2 sess., p. 494) ; Citizens of Marion County, Indiana,
p. 499; Citizens of Ohio. p. 567 ; Citizens of Springfield, Ohio, p. 620; oC Warren
County, Ohio, p. 624; of Hamilton County, Ohio, p. 634; of Cincinnati, Ohio, p.
634. See al~o Senate Journlll. 37 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 90-692, passim.
• Statutes at I,etroc. Proi•isional Go1,en1111c11t of the Confedc,·ate States of
,lmcricet, p. 201.
• July 15, 1861. Cong. Globe, 37 Cong., l sess., p. 120. For the final statute
se1: Stat. at Laroe, XII. 319.
• Cong. Globe, 37 Cong., 1 sess., p. 414.
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the Thirty-Seventh Congress for a full treatment of the difficult
points involved.
It requires laborious application to follow the second confiscation measure along its tortuous course through the long session of
the Thirty-Seventh Congress. The subject was under frequent consideration during the whole of this session from December, 1861,
to the following July. On the opening day, December 2, Senator
Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, a radical Republican, gave notice of
his intention to introduce "a bill for the confiscation of the property
of rebels and giving freedom to the persons they hold in slavery" ;6
on the 5th he presented his bill with brief arguments in its support ;7
later as chairman of the Committee on Judiciary he redrafted the
measure,8 and it was around this nucleus that legislative confiscation
cleYeloped. According to Trumbull's bill, the property of all persons
out of reach of ordinary process of law who were found in arms
against the United States or giving aid or comfort to the rebellion,
,,·as to be forfeited, the seizures to be carried out by such officers,
military or civil, as the President should designate for the purpose.
There were no enumerated classes. the liability to forfeiture being
based simply upon participation in the rebellion. The bill in this
stage differed widely from the measure \\'hich was finally enacted,
but the debates are none the less instructive, since most of those who
spoke c!ealt with the general question rather than with details.
In both houses the supporters of confiscation were Republicans
of the more northern states, while its opponents were men of the
border states and northern Democrats. The advocates of confiscation joined in urging the necessity of a measure to punish the
"rebels"; stress was laid on the importance of crippling the financial resources of the Confederacy, at the same time adding to those
of the Union. and it was urged that in a struggle so gigantic the
Gnion government should exercise the supreme power of selfdefense. On constitutional and legal questions, however. there was
no such harmony of opinion. To raise such points as the war power
uf Congress. the status of the "rebels", the legal character of the
Ci, ii \ \' ar, the restrictions of the attainder clause of the Constitution, the belligerent rights as against the municipal power of Con'' !bit/., 2 sess., p. 1.
'Ibid., p, 18.

• Ibicl., p, 942.
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gress, wa:, to re,eal a deplorable confusion of logic, ancl a jarring
of opinions eYen among those who voted together. L:nitecl in their
notion as to the practical result sought, the supporters of confiscation, it would seem, had as many different views regarding the
constitutional justification of their measure as there were indivi<lual
speakers. Among the opponents of confiscation, inconsistencies anJ
contradictions were no less frequent. Some of the speakers regarded
the measure as too extreme; others clenouncecl its unconstitutionalit};
others spoke for a policy of clemency or argued the inexpediency of
the project.
As the discussion proceeded the possibility of securing a plan
upon which all could agree became fainter. \Vhile the question
would not clown, each time of its recurrence seemed to present new
difficultie:,. ~lotions to substitute radically different measures fur
the bill in hand, motions to postpone, motions to refer, and motions
to amend, "ere continually being pushed, but these only served to
delay and prolong the deliberations, and many a formidable speech
on the merits of the question was deliYcred when in reality the
matter before the I louse was one of parliamentary routine. Finally,
after months of intermittent dcuate. after the appointment in each
house of a select rnmmittee/' the matter was adjusted by a conference committee of both houscs,10 and thus a measure was e\'olved
which passed the two branches of Congress.
As finally passed, the second confiscation law bore the title, •·An
Act to ~uppress ]n,-urrection, to punish Treason and Rebellion, to
~eizc and confiscate the Property of Rebels, and for other Purposes".11 The fir~t four sections, drawn from the Senate bill, relate
to the crime of treason and rebellion and prescribe punishments. Sections 5 and 6 declare the forieiture to the Cnited States of the
property of certain specified classes of "reuels". , \ distinction was
maJe bet\\·cen two main groups. The property of all ofli.cers whether
civil, military, or naYal, of the Confederate government or of any
of the "rebel" ~tates, and of citizens of loyal states giving aid or
comfort to the rebellion, was declared seizable at once without qualification. Other persons in any part of the United States who were
• Cony. <:lobe, 37 Cong.,

"Ibfll., p. 3166.

se~~ .• pp. 18~6. 1991.

n Stat. ot Lorge, XII. 589. The Pxpre,;:;lon "other purposes" referred to
those bl!Ctlons of the Ktntute which prov ided tor thl• forfeiture of sla,·es.
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engaged in or aiding the rebellion were to be warned by public proclamation and given sixty days in which to return to their allegiance;
if they failed to do so their property was to be confiscated. Proceedings against suspected property were to be instituted in the
federal district or circuit courts, and the method of trial was to
conform as nearly as might be to that of reYenue or admiralty cases.
If found to belong to a person who had engaged in rebellion, or
who had given it aid or comfort, the goods were to be condemned
"as enemy's property" and to become the property of the United
States. The proceeds were to be paid into the treasury of the
United States, and applied to the support of the armies. Three
important sections, referring to slaves, do not concern us here. By
section 13 the President was given power to pardon offenses named
in the act.
An analysis of the vote on this measure shows that the division
resulted from a complication of sectional with party interests. In
the House of Representatives the count stood eighty-two to sixtyeight.12 Of the supporters of the bill,13 seventy-seven were Republicans representing constituencies north of the Ohio. All but three
of the Democrats who voted opposed the bill. No such solidarity
was to be found in the majority party, for twenty of the Republican
or Unionist members answered ''nay·•. Of the twenty-five border
state men all but three voted with the opposition.14 In the Senate
the measure recei\'ed twenty-seven affirmative and thirteen negative
votes.16 Eight of those voting in the negative were border state
men, while only seven were thorough Democrats, showing again the
large part which sectional sympathies played in determining the vote.
But the measure was not yet law. President Lincoln, who had
never expressed more than a mild approval of confiscation, objected
to several features of the congressional bill and prepared a rather
elaborate veto message.16 The measure, he said, would result in the
"Cong. Globe, 37 Cong., 2 sess., p. 2361.
,. The three Democrats who favored the b111 were: "\Yllllam G. Brown, from
the loyal portion of Virginia, John Hickman, a Douglas Democrat from Pennsylvania, and John W. Noell, a Union Democrat of :Missouri.
" Besides Brown and Noell the only border state man who favored confiscation was the Intense Unionist and friend of Lincoln, Francis P. Blair or
:Missouri.
"Cong. Globe, 37 Cong., 2 sess., p. 3276.
"Se11ate Journal, 37 Cong., 2 sess., July 17, 1862, pp. 872-874; Nation,al
lntelliget1C:er, July 18, 1862.
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divesting of the title to real estate forever. "For the causes of treason", he pointed out, "and for the ingredients of treason not amounting to the full crime", it declared forfeitures extending beyond the
!ires of the guilty parties. This feature of the bill the President
regarded as a violation of the attainder clause of the Constitution.
Further he argued that the act by proceedings in rem would forfeit
property ''without a conviction of the supposed criminal, or a personal hearing given him in any proceeding'·. \Vhen it was known
in Congress that President Lincoln intended to veto the bill. a rather
unusual proceeding was resorted to. A joint resolution was rushed
through both houses which was intended as "explanatory'' to the
original measure.17 In accordance with this resolution, the law was
not to be construed as applying to acts done prior to its passage,13
nor "as working a forfeiture of the real estate of the offender beyond his natural life". Although this left an important part of his
objections untouched ( i. c .. as to the condemnation of property
without allowing a personal hearing to the supposed criminal),
Lincoln approved the measure in its modified form, and on the last
day of the session, July 17. 1862. he signed the act and the explanatory resolution "as substantially one".19
"Stc,t. at Large, XII. 627; Cong. Globe, 37 Cong., 2 sess., p. 3380.
"In Conrad v. ·waples, 96 l'. S. 279, it was decided that confiscation under
the act of July 17, 1862, applied only to the property or persons who might thereafter be guilty of acts of trea~on and disloyalty. For judicial Interpretation ot
the duration feature of the resolution. see Vi'allach v. Van Riswick, 92 U. S.
208 : Bigelow v. Forrest, 9 \\'allace 339 ; infra, pp. 24-28.
1
'.' Senate Jou1·;u1l. 3i Cong .. :! ~e!-,:s.• July 17, lSG~, pp. 871-872.

II. THE PROCESS A~D EXTE:-JT OF JUDICL\L
CO~FISCATION
TnESE widely different measures of confiscation were put into
operation side by side. and remained so during the war. 20 By the
terms of each of the statutes, the forfeiture of property was made
a strictly judicial process, enforced through the federal district
courts under the direction of the Attorney-General and the district
attorneys. Information concerning confiscable property might reach
the federal officials through regular channels, as by the deposition
of a United States commissioner; it might be supplied gratuitously
by some citizen informer, or it might be secured by the interception
of letters and despatches intended for Confederate owners. The
application of the laws, it must be remembered, was limitecl to those
districts where federal courts were in operation, and, since j urisdiction depended upon situs,21 the property contemplated for seizure
must be located in the north though owned by "rebels".
In beginning suit, a libel of information, analogous to that denounced against smuggled goods, would be filed with the district
attorney; a monition or public advertisement would then be issued by
the marshal summoning the owner to appear in court and establish
his loyalty; then would follow, at its proper time on the docket. the
suit itself, and in case of condemnation, the marshal would be
directed to sell the property at public auction, turning the proceeds.
after the payment of costs, into the public treasury.
The dif-ficulties of enforcing these acts made the work exceedingly distracting to the officials. ?fo distinct department of justice
existed at that time~~ and the office of the Attorney-General, to whom
legal questions ,,·ere referred, was inadequate to the handling of any
,. The existence of the two acls side by side producecl not a little confusion.
Prosecutions in a gl\'en case might be Instituted under either act or under both,
according to the circumstances. In the Wlley case (Ammal Cycl., 1863, p, 220)
the libel was under the act of 1861, and the proof under that of 1862.
21 A district court In New York, for Instance, could not acquire Jurisdiction
over the stock of an Illinois corporation. U. S. v. 1756 Shares of Stock, 27 Fed.
Cas. 337.
n The establishment of the clepa1·tment of justice did not take place untll
June 22, 1870. Stat. at L<L1'ge, XVI. 162.
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1-J.

Tt11: co:-;r-1sc.\TIO'.'; 01' PROPERTY DURIXG THE CI\'IL W,\R

considerable amount of business."3 Doth the published reports and
the manuscript records of the office indicate that its machinery was
slow in starting, and it seems to have encountered considerable
friction when it did start. Upon the difficult legal questions which
arose in connection with the initiation of proceedings. there was considerable confusion of thought in the minds of the district attorneys,
and little help in this matter was secured from the office of the
Attorney-General who invariably "declined to advise the law officers
of the government as to what constitutes a proper case for action
under the law''.~4 The local officers, thus left to their own responsibility, naturally hesitated to bring action, and this difficulty was
augmented by the fact that no regular provision was made for
defraying the preliminary expenses of preparing a suit in cases
\\ here the government might fail to secure conviction.
Taken all together, therefore, this seemingly smooth and workable method of seizure was seen to involl'e serious obstacles. The
very correctness and completeness of the judicial process made it
impracticable in a :,trenuous time when things had to be done
quickly, and when a dilatory execution would seem to defeat the
whole purpose of the law. It was natural under the circumstances
for an impatient general or provost-marshal to take the law into his
own hands and by his summary action become involved in disputes
with the judiciary. These vigorous men regarded confiscation as a
war measure, and proceeded to carry it out as such.2.l It was doubtless the purpose of Congress, however, to guard carefully the exercise of a power so formidable, and one which might be put to so
great abuse.
•
In view of these distracting conditions the lax and irregular
enforcement of the acts will not cause surprise. Though a considerable litigation \\as occasioned, the net results, after deducting
,. The total monthly pay-roll at this period amounted to only $1,522.06, while
the schedule or salaries showed only eight employees In the entire office, the
Attorney-Gen1<ral, :tH8h<tant attorney-general, chief clerl<, four assl8tant clerks,
and one messenger. (These data are revealed tn tile flies of tile AttorneyGeneral's office, Washington, for September, 1864.)
"Acting Attorney-General T. J. Cotree to R. I. Milton, U. S. Commissioner,
Albany, New York, September 2, 1861. (Letter-Book "B 4'", Dept. of Justice, p.
147. A serl~s of such letters of Instruction was Issued to district attorneys and
mar:;hnl" during the same month. The one cited ls merely typical.)
'• Instances of conflict between civil and mllltary officers regarding conftscatlon were not uncommon. A dispute arose over a mllltary seizure of property
In \Vash!ngton belonging to John A. Campbell, Confederate assistant secretary
or war. House Ex. Doc. 41. 37 Cong., 3 sess. I•'or General Lew ,vanace's action
In directing extensive military seizures In Maryland see 0.D'lcial Record, third
series, lV. 407, 413, 431.

the heavy judicial costs, 26 and after allowing for cases dismissed,
appeale<l, ·•settled ""ithout suit", or in which the judgment was
entered for the claimant, were almost incredibly small. 27 ln New
York, $19,614; in Louisiana, $67,973; in West \'irginia, $11,000;
in Indiana, $5,737-these sums, so far as mere financial totals can
tell the story, a1·e representative of the extent of the confiscations.
According to a report of the solicitor of the Treasury Department
dated December 27, 1867. the total proceeds actually paid into the
treasury up to that time amounted to the insignificant sum of
$129,680.:is In comparison with these figures, the confident predictions of the supporters of confiscation in Congress as to the material
weakening of the enemy's resources sound strange in<leed. This
plausible justification, then, of a policy so extreme as that of
general confiscation was based on an unfortunate miscalculation.
Enough indeed was clone to work individual hardship, and to add
to the bitter feelings following the war, but the comparatively few
transfers of property gave the Union government no material
a<lrnntage at all ,,ufficient to justify so questionable a war measure.
Financially, it may be said, confiscation was a failure, while the
other purpose of the act, that of punishing the "rebels'', was very
unequally accomplished.
,. 'l'he cost attached to the filing and publicatlon of the libel, and the fees
charged by the district attorney, clerk, and marshal, always reduced by a large
proportion the balance remaining to the United States. The following case presents a rather striking coincidence, the various Items of expense forming a total
which corre~ponds exactly to the amount of the proceeds. Flies or U. S. District
Court for Indiana, case no. 205, January 17, 1863.
Proceeds of sale (of "credits etc.") ................................ $202.00
i\larshal's costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51.36
l\Iarshal's fees ..................................... 63.27
Docket tees ........................................ 40.00
Clerk's costs ...................................... 44.12
Clerk's fees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.25
'202.00
Balance for United States treasury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0." An examination of the docket books and Illes of the federal district court
In Indiana reveals 83 cases of confiscation between September, 1862, and May,
1865. Of these, H resulted In forfeiture. 'l'he property seized was miscellaneous
In character, Including real estate, credits, cash, judgments In court, commercial
stocks, goyernment bonds. cotton, whiskey, a stall!on, and a stea.m-englne. In
the Dlstl•ict of Columbia, from May, 1863, when condemnations began, to September, 1860, the number of cases doclteted wa~ 52, and the number of forfeitures
~i. 'l'he totals given In the annual reports of the solicitor of the treasury are
unsatisfactory, since he combines confiscation suits with forfeitures under nonIntercourse regulations, and sometimes with prize cases. See Fina1we Reports,
1SG3, p. 90, 186-!, p. 88.
'' Sen. Ex. Doc. 58, 40 Cong., 2 sess.

This report or the solicitor was based
upon the financial returns which marshals were required to make to the Treasury Depnrlment. 'l'he total which It shows does not Include the returns In the
District or Columbia, amounting to $33,265, which were deposited In the registry
of the court and later restored to the owners. It excludes also the proceeds
of the Virginia confiscations. because of the fact that the clerk of the district
cou1·t of that state was a defaulter to the extent of $91,679.29. The proceeds
or the Kansas cases were not reckoned In for a similar reason. By the addlt.011 of ~uch sums a,; these the net proceeds of confiscation wm be seen to approximate $275,000. ( Conslderahle unpublished material relating to the Virginia
confi~cation~, comprising leuers, receipts, depositions, nnd rPports of lnYesttg.nlng officers, may be found In the Illes of the Miscellaneous Division of the
Treasury Department, market! "Cotton and Captured Property I!ecord, J:liO".
ll ·K'11'ding the Kansas cases, see Osborn 11. U. S., 91 U. S. 474.)

III.

CQ\_'FJSC.\TIOX .\S :\ BELLIGEREXT RIGHT

Ix the field of jndicial interpretation the confiscation problem
proved equally as troublesome as in Congressional debate or in its
official enforcement. The relation of confiscation to the mies of
international law was, to begin with, the source of continual confusion. \\"hen the confiscation policy was under discussion both
sides appealed to the law of nations for a support of their claims.
As usual in such contro\'ersies. much would have bC'en gained if the
direct issue had been dearly stated and kept in mind. Freed from
its entanglements the question amounts to this: Does the law of
nations allow to a belligerent in a public war the right to confiscate
,Yhatever property. within reach of its courts, belongs to the enemy?
~umerous misapprehensions and inaccuracies, however, entered into
the actual discussion of this issue. There \\·as great difference of
opinion as to the applicability of the mies of international law to the
con0ict then waging. \\'as the struggle to he regarded as a domestic
rebellion, or a public war? \\'ere those supporting the Con federate
cau:,e to be treated a~ rebels or as enemies? ln a civil war. is a
nation restricted by the rules of international law in its operations
against the insurgent power. or may it punish these insurgents by
municipal regulations?
But. assuming that the legal character of the Civil \Var had been
determined, a further difficulty remained. There was commonly a
failure. in the clel>at1.·s, to discriminate hct\,·een a general l'Onfiscation of proJ erty within the jurisdiction of the confiscating go,·ernment. and the treatment accordC'd by victorious armies to private
propC'rty found within the limits of military occupation. Thus the
genrral rule cx<'mpting private property on Janel from the sort of
rapture which similar property must suffer at sea, was erroneously
appealed to as an inhibition upon the right of judicial confiscation. 29
1' E\'i•n Dunning, In his 1·.'uay8 on thr Cit"i/ ll'ar and Rcennstructlan, though
he treats direct!~· the prhwlr11t,s or lntt•rnatlonnl Ltw ln\'Ol\'ed in the confiscation
POiley, gln•s no pla<'e to thlA di~ttnctlon between mllit.,ry sl'lzure and judlclal
conflscution. "In the modern pracllc!'I or clvlllzed nations", he says, "the genernl connscal!on or enernlps' private property I~ unknown. It Is as obsolete a~
the poisoning or wells in an enemy'R country. AM a rule, rcn.l estate ls left to
its <>wner", an,I mo,·abl, s are appror•rlated only so far a1< military necessity,
a,- jmlJ:ed by thP commander In the IIPld, seems to demand It". Dunning then
contlnt1<'~ the <ll•ru"•ion, ~till with rl'fl>rence to the trea(ment or prlvat,· properly by military officer", nn<I for aut11orlty refer!! to th~ pnssago In Halleck
which cleals not with conn sen t!on by juc\lclal process within the jurl~dlct!on ot
tho confiscating state, but with the treatment or property hy generalH In mllltarv occupation or a pnrt or the enemy's country. See Dunning, E11says, pp,
31-3Z.
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That a military capture on land analogous to prize at sea was not
regarded as a legitimate war measure was so obvious and well recognized a principle that it would hardly require a continual reaffirmation. It was a very different matter, howeYer, so far as the law
and practice of nations was concerned, for a belligerent to attack
through its courts whatever enemy's property might be available
within its limits. \\'here the language was accurate, it was this form
of seizure that was contemplated whenever confiscation was claimed
as a belligerent right. In this connection much was said about the
relation between conqueror and vanquished, which was also beside
the point.
vVhen after the war the question of confiscation as a belligerent
right was presented to the Supreme Court30 the legal precedents
were various and doubtful. 31 Though the trend of modern usage
favored the milder practice, the court, without arguing the points of
international law involved, rested the justification for the second
Miller v. u. s., 11 ·wanace 268.
Among the early authorities on International law whose opinion would
carry weight In America, Vattel and Pul'fendorf favored the milder practice,
Burlamaqul and Rutherford did not deal directly with the form of confiscation
adopted during the Civil War, while Bynkershoeck was among the few to state
In Its bald severity the extreme right of the belligerent over the enemy's property. Grotius, the pioneer authority, In the field of modern International law,
allows to a belllgerent very extensive rights over the persons and property of
the enemy. In his closest approach to the subject of confiscation as understood
In the Civil "'ar he admits, though without any indication of Individual approval,
that the right of appropriation applies to "enemy goods found among us at
the outhreal< of war". ,ve may class Grotius, then, as a supporter of the
belligerent right of confiscation, but In so doing we must bear in mind that,
In large part, the tone or his work Is that of a reluctant statement of unregenerate practice. To derive clear authority for confiscation Indeed Crom any of
the~e early writers requires a rather sympathetic editing. Valtcl, Law of
Nations (Luke White ed., Dublin, 1792), bk. III., sec. 76; Pufl'endorf, Drolt
de la Nat11re et des Gens, llv. VIII., ch. v., sec. xvii ff. ; Burlamaqui, Principles
of Natt1ral and Political Science (Nugent transl., Boston, 1792), pp. 375 ff.;
Rutherford, Institutes of Nat1tral Law (second Am. ed., 1632), ch. 1x., passim:
Bynkershoek, Q1,aestiones J11ri$ Publtci (1737), lib. J., ch. 7, p. 176; Grotius,
De J11re Belli ac Pacis, lib. III., cap. YI, sec. xlll. In the case of ·ware v.
Hylton, 3 Dallas 199, argued before the Supreme Court In 1796, many prominent American jurists of the time expressed opinions upon the right of confiscation. John Marshall, arguing for Virginia's claim to certain British debts
sequestered during the Revolution, declared emphatically for the general right
of confiscation, but his attitude was that of an advocate not a. judge, and bis
Interpretation of the authorities was not lnfalllble. Later, as Chief Justice,
Marshall prepared the opinion of the Supreme Court In Brown v. U. S. (8
Cranch ll O), a case Involving the right of the United States government to
seize British property found on land at the commencement of tbe War of 1812.
Basing his sweeping conclusion upon the partial citation of authorities sub00
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confiscation act upon the law of nations. The measure was sustained on this broad basis as an "undoubted belligerent right" and
was construed as the exercise of a war power, not as a municipal
regulation. It is to be observed that there underlay this decision a
presumption which had caused much controversy and honest difference of opinion-a presumption which was not rendered less conspicuous by the omission of arguments drawn from the domain of
international law. The question was a fair one whether the right
of confiscation could be clearly claimed on the basis of the law of
nations, and this was a point of much larger importance and greater
difficulty than would be indicated by the off-hand assertion of the
court that Congress in passing the second confiscation act was exercising "an undoubted belligerent right''. It has been an accepted
practice in our courts to recognize international law as a "part of
our law", 32 and while the judicial branch of the government would
not be likely to invalidate a law of Congress on the ground that it
Yiolated the rules of international law, it usually takes care to consider these rules as fully as possible, and even to interpret the intent
of Congress in the light of such rules. Even though one may not
deny the ~oundness of the position assumed by the Supreme Court,
there is still room for the wish that so important a subject had been
handled with less superficiality.
mltted by the counsel for the appellant, Marshall wrote: "It may be considered as the opinion of all who have written on the jus belli, that war gives
the right to confiscate, but does not Itself confl~cate the property of the enemy".
J\ special act, so the court held, was necessary to authorize such seizures. Story
went e\'en further In his dissenting opinion and maintained that the right of
confiscation vested at once in the executive on the outbreak of war, without
the express provision or any statute. ·w hen one seeks the authority which
these men quote, however, he ls apt to find, in the passage cited, a treatment
of capture, or booty, or the levy of contributions-topics quite distinct from
confiscation. Story's reference to PufCendorf as a supporter of confiscation
!s an example of this stretching of the authorlt!es. (8 Cranch 143.) Of the
later writers, Kent favored the sterner rule, while Wheaton emphasized the
milder practice which, however, 1,e declared to be "not Inflexible". Kent
(Oomm., eleventh ed.), I. 66-67; Wheaton, Inteniational Law (Boyd ed.), pp.
410, 413.

•• Hilton 11. Guyot, 159 U. S. 163; ·ware v. Hylton. 3 Dallas 281; the Paquette
Elabana, 175 U. S. 700.

IV.

THE PROBLEM OF REBEL STATUS

\\'m,:~ we study the problem of rebel status in relation to confiscation another series of legal tangles emerges. Though the question of such '·status" might appear chiefly theoretical and involve
much abstract reasoning, yet it seemed an inevitable requirement of
the laws of intellect that men who discussed confiscation should
have in mind some guiding principle, either expressed or implied,
as to the legal standing of persons engaged in the rebellion. In this
connection, therefore, the question bore directly upon the larger
legal problems which the Ch·il \Yar called forth. Here arose the
same difficulty which presented itself in connection with the treatment of Confederate privateers. the blockading of soutilern ports,
and the non-intercourse law~.:ii l n a different phase the question
again forced itself upon the attention of the government after the
war when reconstruction issues were pending and the policy of
pardon and amnesty was urged by the President and opposed by the
radicals of Congress.
At first sight the situation would seem to resolve itself into a
simple alternative. On the one hand, the se,·erity of the law of
treason could be invoked, and the insurgents could be held liable to
treatment as criminals. In this case the government would be acting
in the capacity of a sovereign punishing its rebellious citizens for
their , iolation of allegiance. Or, on the other hand, the rebellion
could be regarded as a public war, and all the privileges and amenities prescribed by the law of nations for the treatment of belligerents
could be accorded to the Confederacy. The government, in taking
this attitude, would appear to be laying aside its sovereign control
over the South. and opposing the Confederate states only as a
belligerent would oppose his enemy. The struggle would then be a
clash bct·wec11 g01wmne11/s, not a conflict of individuals against
their go\'ernment. There was, however, a third possibility which
would be most likely to commend itself to an administration guided
by a spirit of expediency or practical opportunism rather than of
rigid adherence to consistent principles. Instead of selecting one or
"The well-known work ot Professor Dunning, Easav11 on the Civil War ana
Reco1tstruct10-., contains the best generol discussion ot these legal problems
1'·hlch the 1'·rlter hn~ found.

(19)

20

'l'Tlf~ CONFISC,\1'10:N OI' PROPERTY DL Rl1"C THE Cl VIL W.\R

the other of the two alternatives as an exclusive rule of conduct, the
goYemment could suit the rule to the occasion, and adopt whichever
course might appear most suitable in a given situation. The theory
of traitor status was, in the opinion of many, a convenient justification for certain severe measures which were more or less directly
contemplated and which could rest on no other accepted principle,
as for instance the condemnation after the war of the principal
Confederate leaders under domestic criminal law. It became apparent at once, however, that this severe principle could not be adhered
to rigidly. In the ordinary conduct of the war it was the j11s bel/i,
not the lex talio11is which must govern the armies. In the declaration of blockade and in the treatment of privateers as public enemies
instead of pirates, the administration followed the only rational and
humane course possible, but in these particulars the insurgents were
undoubtedly recognized as belligerents.
So far the way seemed clearly marked out by the plain dictates
of reason and humanity, and there was no serious difference of
op1mon. \\"hen the question of confiscation was reached, howc\'er,
there was no generally conceded principle around which all could
unite, and it was in this connection that the difficulty regarding rebel
status reached its most acute stage. The subject was beclouded
rather than clarified by the debates. On the one hand the rebels
were re fcrred to as red-handed, black-hearted pirates, and traitors, 34
unworthy of claiming a single belligerent right. On the other hand
they were represented as a regularly constituted governmental power
with an organized administration in control. an authorized army in
the field, and with all the attributes of a belligerent in a public war.a;;
It remained for the Supreme Court, in a few clear-cut decisions,
to present what seems the only practical solution of the problem, by
adopting the convenient and flexible principle of the double status
of the rebels. In the Amy \Varwick case Justice Sprague thus ex.. Sec 8peeches or g111ot of MaHHachusetts tn the Houso or Represen tattves

( Cong. Globe. 37 Cong., 2 sess., p. 2234), Howard ot :Michigan ( ibict., p, 1717 ),
and Da\'18 of Kentuck~• ( ibid., p. 17 59).

"The words or Blair of Pennsyl\'anla, who favored connscatton. present a
good statement ot the principle or betttgcrent status: "What aro our relations to
these rebellious people? They are ut war with us, having an organized government In the cabinet, and an organized army In tho neld, and I hold that In the
conduct nnd manegr·ment ot the war on our part we arc compelled to act
towards them as If they were a foreign Go\'ernment or n thousand years'
existence, between whom and us hostilities ha\'e broken out". Cong. Globe, 37
Cong., 2

SUflS.,

p. 2299.
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pressed the views of the majority of the court: "I am satisfied that
the United States as a nation have full and complete belligerent
rights, which are in no degree impaired by the fact that their enemies
owe allegiance and have superadded the guilt of treason to that
of unjust war". 36 A similar expression is that of Justice Grier in
the Prize Cases : "The law of nations . . . contains no such anomalous doctrine as that which this court are now for the first time
desired to pronounce, to wit: That insurgents who have risen in
rebellion against their sovereign, expelled her courts, established a
revolutionary government, organized armies, and commenced hostilities, are not enemies because they are traitors; and a war levied
on the government by traitors, in order to dismember and destroy
it, is not a war because it is an 'i11surrectio11'."31 Again, in Miller v.
United States: "Whatever may be true in regard to a rebellion
that does not rise to the magnitude of a war, it must be that when
it has become a recognized war those who are engaged in it are to
be regarded as enemies."38
With this statement of the broad theoretical problem in mind
we may now turn to a detailed phase of the question of rebel status
in which its practical application and its bearing upon individual
rights stant; ut.a dearly. One of the cumm~ ,1 di:"fi:nltic,; n n fronting
lhe courts in the enforcement of the confiscation acts was to decide
\\'hether, in the seizure of property of persons adhering to the rebellion, opportunity should be given to the supposed ''rebel" to appear
in court and plead his case. On the one hand stood the principle
that an enemy has no standing in court, while on the other hand the
very nature of the proceeding under the confiscation acts was such
that judgment must rest upon a determination of the fact as to
whether or not the party was actually engaged in the rebellion-a
point on which the owner could claim a right lo be heard. l\Ioreover it was ably contended that a quasi-criminal character39 per" 2 Sprague 123.

2 Black 670. See also pp. 672 and 673. As to the necessity of some
concession of belligerent rights In the case of a formidable rebellion, see Wlllllams v. Bn1ffy, 96 U. S. 187. There the Sup1·eme Court declared that such concessions depend upon "the considerations of justice, humanity, and policy controlling the government".
" 11 ~·a11ace 309.
"The Supreme Court Is authority for the statement that actions In confiscation were "In no sense criminal proceedings", and were "not govemed by the
rules that prevail In respect to Indictments or criminal Informations". The only
17
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tainecl to confiscation proceedings, requiring the same strict construction of the law in the interest of the accused as belongs to
actions brought under a criminal indictment Such construction
would certainly not deny to the suspected "rebel" all opportunity
whatever of conducting a defense in court.
The practice during the war on this point was uncertain and
frequently detrimental to the interests of the accused. In the district court for the eastern district of Virginia a general rule was
prescribed which disallowed a hearing in the case of persons adhering to the rebellion. 40 In a case tried before Judge Betts of the
southern district of New York in July, 1863, the defendant, a resident of Alabama,41 duly filed an ans,Yer to the allegations set forth
in the libel of information against his property, but the judge
ordered this answer to be stricken from the files on the ground that
the defendant was an "alien enemy", and hence had no perso11a
standi in a court of the United States.42 An able criticism of Judge
Betts's position is to be found in the A111111al Cyclopedia for 1863.
The writer points out that if Betts's doctrine was correct "the mere
fact of Mr. Wiley's [the defendant's] residence in a southern insurrectionary state precludes him from appearing and contesting the
allegations of the libel that he has rendered active aid to the rebellion. . . . Under such a practice every dollar of property owned by
.Southern citizens in the North, no matter how loyal, need only be
,eized under an allegation of disloyal practices. and as the accused
cannot be heard to deny that allegation ( and if he remains silent
no proof of it is required), the whole matter is very summarily disposed of to the great comfort and advantage of the informer, and
to the increment of his personal possessions."
This question whether a rebel should have a hearing in a federal
court on the issue of the condemnation of his property waited tiH
after the war for its settlement by the Supreme Court. The case
subject of Inquiry in si.:ch cases, In the opinion of the court, was the liability of
the property to confiscation. and persons were 1•eferrcd to only to identify the
property. (The Conllsc-atlon Ca~es. 20 Wallace 104-105. In this case there were
three dissenting Judg, s.) For a YlgorOu8 statement of the view that lhe conllsc·atlons partook largPIY or the nature of crhnlnal statutes, see Field's dissentIng opinion In Tyler r. Dcfrees, 11 Wallace 331, and Lincoln's proposed veto
1ne~:,;:age, Se;iute Jour;ud. 37 Con~·.,:! se~~., July 17, 1862, P. 873.
•• Semple 1•. l'. S., 21 Fed. Cas. I 072.
"A111,11al Cycl., 1863, p, 220.
"J~cl,er r. :\fon1gon,ery. lR Howard 112, and case~ cited.
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was that of :\lcVeigh v. U. S.-one of the prominent confiscation
cases. 43 In its facts the case resembled that in which Judge Betts
had given his radical decision. A libel of information had been
filed in the eastern \'irginia district to reach certain real and personal property of :McVeigh who was charged with having engaged
in armed rebellion. McVeigh appeared by counsel. interposed a
claim to the property, and filed an answer to the information. By
motion of the district attorney, however, the appearance. answer,
and claim were stricken from the files for the reason that the respondent was a "resident of the city of Richmond, within the Confederate lines. and a rebel". The property was condemned and
ordered to be sold. \ \'hen the case reached the Supreme Court the
judgment was reversed. and the action of the district attorney
unanimously condemned. The court held that J\kVeigh's alleged
criminality lay at the foundation of the proceeding, and that the
questions of his guilt and ownership were therefore fundamental
in the case. The order to strike the claim and answer from the files
on the ground that :Mc\'eigh was a "rebel" amounted to a prejudgment of the very point in question without a hearing. The
court below in issuing this order had acted on the theory that no
enemy of the United States could have standing in its courts, but the
higher tribunal refused to allow such an application of this principle. On this fundamental question, therefore, the Supreme Court
was committee! to the proposition that a "rebel" should not be
denied the right to a hearing in connection with the seizure of his
property by a federal court. Had this conclusion been pronounced
early enough to produce uniformity of practice during the war, and
had the Supreme Court itself maintained this principle consistently,
the advantage of the ~lcVeigh decision would have been far greater
than was actually the case.
•• 11 \',allace 259; see also "'indsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274.

\'.

TTIE DURATIO:\1' OF THE FORFEITURE

\\'1~ consider under this caption the legal controversy as to
whether judgments against the property of "rebels'' should involve
the surrender of the full title in fee simple. or only a life interest.
In spite of the fact that Congress took special pains to be explicit
on this point, even to the extent of passing a joint resolution explanatory of the original statute, 14 it seems to have been variously
interpreted. Judge Underwood of Virginia. in the Hugh Latham
case, argued for the absolute forfeiture of real estate as in keeping
with the intention of the constitution and the statute. Congress did
not mean. declared the judge, that the "traitor" should merely surrender a life inerest, but only that the forfeiture must be perfected
during his life. As for the joint resolution, he interpreted it as
merely intended to keep the legislation within the constitutional
rights of Congress which permit no attainder of treason that shall
"work corruption of blood or forfeiture except during the life of
the person attainted".45 The words "except during" were held to
apply to the specific legal act by which the forfeiture was accomplished, rather than to its duration.
\Vhen, however, this important question was presented to the
Supreme Court in 1869, the reasoning of Judge Underwood was set
aside, and the duration of the forfeiture was held to terminate with
the life of the offender. One Douglas Forrest had brought suit in
a Virginia court to recover the forfeited estate of his father French
Forrest, who had been a Confederate naval officer, and the case was
appealed to the Supreme Court.46 The original confiscation had
taken place in 1863, and no question was raised as to the regularity
of the confiscation decree, or the validity of the marshal's sale
under it. Forrest maintained, however, that only a life interest had
been conveyed by this sale, while the plaintiff, Bigelow, claimed a
right in fee simple to the property. The court decided that the act
of 1862 and the accompanying explanatory resolution are to be
taken together, and that they "admit of no doubt that all which
could under the law become the property of the United States, or
•• Supra, p. 12.
"McPherson, Hist. of tile Rebellion, p. 206.
"Bigelow v. Forrest, 9 "'allace 339.
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could be sold by virtue of a decree of condemnation and order of
sale, was a right to the property seized terminating with the life of
the person for whose act it had been seized". No title could therefore be conferred, which would outlast the life of the original
offencler.47
As to forfeitures under the act of 1861, their effect was held
to be absolute, permitting no recovery of the property by the owner's
heirs. The reasoning of the Supreme Court in this connection emphasizes the difference in the nature of the two acts. 48 \Vhereas
proceedings under the act of 1862 were directed against the owner,
because of his quasi-criminal character, the proceedings under the
act of 1861 were directed merely against the property. Nothing
was said about treason; therefore the principles of attainder would
not apply. Condemnations under this act were based upon the
hostile use of the property, and were regarded as analogous to the
condemnation of goods for smuggling or for violation of nonintercourse regulations, and this interpretation required that the
whole title be surrendered.
"See also, on the duration of the forfeiture, Day 11. Micou, 18 Wall. 156 ;
U. S. 11. Clarke, 20 \Yall. 92; Waples 11. Bays, 108 U. S. 6.
"Kirk 11. Lynd, 106 U. S. 315,

\T

REVERSIO)..:ARY RIGHTS I~ CONFISCATED
PROPERTY

Tm~ points just noted regarding the duration of the forfeiture
are intimately connected with the difficult problem of the reversionary right in confiscated property. A deed to the life estate in a
piece of realty secured at a confiscation sale does not carry a title in
fee to the property, since the heirs of the '·rebel'' owner have a
future interest which takes effect upon his death. Such a situation
affords an excellent example of a "reversion'', which has been defined
as "the estate left in a party after he has comeyed away less than
a fee''.4g This naturally involves a "reversionary tenant'', i. e., a
hokier of the future rights which revert when the user's interest
terminates. It is well understood in realty law that such a reversionary right in property is marketable, and may be transferred.50
The question arose frequently whether, after confiscation proceedings had been completed, the dispossessed ·'rebel'' could still consider
himself as the holder and possible c01weyer of that remaining share
in the estate ,,·hich subsisted after the life interest had been transferred. It is clear that if he could convey this expectant right the
penalty of his forfeiture would be much less severe. \,\'e may now
turn to some of the judicial pronouncements dealing with this
problem.
In the case of Wallach z,. Van Riswick, appealed to the Supreme
Court in 1875, the question was presented whether the former
owner of a confiscated estate could transfer by deed the suspended
fee to the property.61 The court expressed the opinion that Congress had passed the second confiscation act with the purpose of
completely dispossessing the owner of all benefits in the property
seized, and had not intended to permit him to retain any right of
conveyance whatever; that the forfeiture while it lasted was complete,-·'a devolution upon the United States of the owner's entire
right"' ; and that the provision regarding the duration of the for•• ,lnie1·lc1m Law an<L Pmcedure (pub. by Lasalle Extension Uni,•ersltY, Chicago), V. 92. See also Kale, Future Interests, secs. 68; 121 toll.
,. Burton t,. Smith, 13 Peters 480; Hempstead v. Dickson. 20 Ill. 193; Wlll:am8 on Real Property, p. 256.
" 92 u. s. 202.
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feiture was introduced for the ad,·antage of the children and heirs
alone, not as a "benefit to the traitor by leaving in him a vested
interest in the subject of the forfeiture". While evading the
theoretical question as to where the suspended fee resided during
the life of the "traitor'' the court nevertheless declared that it could
not dwell in the offender, since Congress did not intend that he
should be the tenant of the reYersion. On the basis of such arguments the court ruled that the offender had no power to dispose of
the future title to his property.
It would be hard to find a more categorical and positive declaration of law than the \Vallach decision, and yet in the course
of a few years the Supreme Court gradually retreated from its
position as there stated, until it had virtually reversed its opinion.
\Ve find various decisions in which it was maintained that after the
death of the offender, his heirs secure the property by inheritance,
and not by grant from the government. This would tend to place
the suspended fee in the offender and make him the tenant in reversion.52 In the case of the Illinois Central Railroad i•. Dosworth,53 the
court argued that after confiscation the fee remained in abeyance,
and then, adopting a figure of shadowy personification, declared:
"It is not necessary to be overcurious about the intermediate state
in which the disembodied shade of nake,1 ownership may have wandered during the period of its ambiguous existence. It is enough
to know that it was neither annihilated nor confiscated. nor appropriated to any third party". The court then argued that the ''naked
fee" subject to the usufruct of the purchaser under confiscation
proceedings, remained in the offender himself, though without any
power on his part to dispose of it. The next step was to maintain
that by reason of special pardon or general amnesty after the war,
the disability to dispose of the permanent title was removed.
Finally, in connection with an Ohio case in 1892, came the
practical reversal of the Wallach decision.64 The property of one
Jenkins had been confiscated in 1863 and purchased by one Collard.
In 1865 Jenkins transferred to Collard all his interest and estate
in the property for a consideration of $18,000 accompanying the
"Avegne v. Schmidt, llS U. S. 293; Shields
133 u. s. 92.
"145 u. s. 652.
63

1•.

Schiff, 124 U. S. 351.
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transaction with a covenant of general warranty•• binding himself
and his heirs. The court was called upon to settle whether the title
thus conveyed was valid against the Jenkins heirs, or in other words
whether Jenkins could dispose of these reversionary rights. The
court summarized the earlier decisions and criticized at some length
the opinion in the \\'allach case. The ground of the criticism was
that the ruling imposing on the offender the disability to transfer
the reversionary rights was based not upon any express provision
of the statute, but upon what the court thought the policy of confiscation to involve-in other words, it was a piece of "court-made
law". Then, applying the law to the Jenkins case in the light of its
later judgment, the Supreme Court ruled that the offender, by his
covenant of warranty, could convey a permanent future assurance
of title which would hole\ good against all the claims of his heirs.

In effect this was of course a reversal of the rule set up in the
\Vallach case.56 A study of the steps taken in this whole series of
legal changes seems to reveal an increasing tendency toward a more
liberal interpretation of harsh statutes, while it suggests at the
same time the difficulty of consistently applying the confiscation acts
in the details of individual cases.
., By issuing a "co\'enant of warranty•• the grantor assures the grantee that
he shall not at any future lime be evicted by paramount title. Bouvier, Law
Dictionciry.
•• If any mistake or fault can be attributed to the court, it probably consisted in tal<lng an unnecessarily extreme position In the Wallach case. The
point in dispute could have been satisfied by merely ruling that at the time
of the transaction In question "'allach was disabled from conveying the fee,
and such a position would ha\'e been consistent with the later rulings. (For a
summary or all the decisions relating to this subject, see U. S. v. Dunnington,
146 u. s. 338.)

VII. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CONFISCATION ACTS
A PROBLEM more fundamental perhaps than any of the abO\·e
was that which concerned the constitutionality of the confiscation
acts. It was not surprising that this legislation which had been
enacted against the judgment of many of the ablest thinkers in Congress, which had barely escaped the presidential veto, and which had
occasioned the greatest uncertainty in its judicial enforcement,
should have to meet sooner or later that peculiar ordeal to which
all American laws are liable-the test of constitutionality. The
wonder is that the test was deferred so long, for it was not until
1871 that the matter of constitutionality was made a direct issue
before the Supreme Court. The case was that of 1\Iiller v. United
States-a proceeding under both of the confiscation acts to forfeit
certain shares of railroad stock in two Michigan corporations.67
The information filed against this stock alleged it to be the property
of Samuel Miller, a Virginia "rebel"'. An essential feature of the
case was the fact that Miller had disregarded the notice and the
district court in Michigan, without a hearing of the case, had entered
a decree of condemnation by default. Miller's attorney complained
that the acts of Congress on which the seizure and the condemnation
by default had been based were unconstitutional, involving a violation of the fifth and sixth amendments, which have to do with the
guarantees of due process of law and of property rights.
The court met the defendant's objections by a liberal reliance on
the "war power" and by reference to earlier decisions in which
related problems had been settled. The primary question of the
nature of the Civil \\'ar had been fully treated in the Prize Cases,58
where the court had defined the conflict as one of sufficient magnitude to give the United States all the rights and powers appropriate
to a foreign or national war. The belligerent rights of the United
States, then, were not diminished by the fact that the conflict was
a civil war. In the same decisions the relation of the Union government to the insurrectionary districts was dealt with, and the rights
both of a sovereign and a belligerent were held to belong to the
" 11 Wallace 304 ff.
" 2 Black 673.
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government of the United States. The court proceeded on the
basis of these previous decisions to analyze the confiscation acts and
defend their coni;titutionality. The most important problems before
the court under the head of constitutionality were: first, to decide
under what category to place confiscation, i. c., whether to regard
1t as the exercise of war power or as a municipal regulation; and
second, to deal with the objection that the act ,iolated the fifth and
sixth amendments relating to rights of property and of impartial
trial. As to the first of the~e problems the court laid down the
doctrine that the confiscation acts were not passed as a municipal
regulation but as a war measure. \\"ith a tone of certainty which,
as we have seen, the precedents hardly warranted, the court declared
that "this is and always has been an undoubted belligerent right".
Congress had "full power to provide for the seizure and confi~cation of any property which the enemy or adherents of the enemy
could u~e for the purpose of maintaining the war against the government". The act of 1861, and the fifth, sixth, and seventh sections of the act of 1862. were therefore construed as an enforcement
of the belligerent rights which Congress amply possessed during the
Civil War.
Having thus placed the confiscation acts within the category of
war measures, the court found little difficulty in meeting the objection that the acts involved a violation of the fifth and sixth amendments. The relevant provisions in these amendments are that no
person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
and that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right to a l-peedy ancl public trial by an impartial jury of the state
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed. The
acts, as we have abo,e noted, permitted judgment on default without a jury trial, without a per,-onal hearing, and without a determination of the facts as to the guilt of the owner. It was admitted
by the court that if the purpose of the acts had been to punish
offenses against the sovereignly of the United States, i. e., if they
had been criminal statutes enacted under the municipal power of
Congress, there would have been force in the objection that Congress had disregarded its constitutional restrictions. Since, however, the acts were passed in exercise of the war powers of the government, they were held to be unaffected by the limitations fixed
by the fifth and sixth amendments.
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Three of the judges. Field, Clifford. and Davis. dissented from
this opinion. Their grounds of disagreement "ere that the forfeiture~ in question were puniti,·e in their nature. being based on the
municipal not the war power of Congress, that condemnations
must depend on the per-.onal guilt of the owner, that judgments
again~t the property should only result frurn proceedings i11 rem to
ascertain the guilt or innocence l f the supposed offender, and that
therefore a judgment uased on mere default in such case~ would
amount to a denial of "·due process of law'". The,;e words of the
dissenting judges not only agree exactly with one of the important
points in Lincoln"s objections, but they harmonize very well with
the position of the Supreme Court itself when dealing with the
problem whether a "rebel'" should have a hearing. \Ve noticed in
connection with the ~lc\'eigh case that the court insisted upon the
necessity of a hearing to determine the question of the owner's
alleged rebellion. The dissenting judges in the ;-.liller case were
merely applying this same principle to the case of default. It was
not even necessary. said the majority of the court, to conduct an
ex partc hearing after the default. The entry of the default in due
form \\ a:; to be regarded as establishing all the facts averred in the
in formation, as in the case of confession. or of actual conYiction on
evidence. It was this principle which. according to the minority
view. \\'OUld inrnlve serious judicial usurpation, and •·work a complete revolution in our criminal jurisprudence". To the thoughtful
student this view of the minority judges seems but a natural protest
again:,t an extreme and unjust claim. The dissenting position
appears still stronger when it is remembered that the majority judges
admitted the incompetency of Congress to allow such judgments
as the confiscation acts permitted on the basis of municipal law,
and that the "war power" theory was the convenient door of escape
from this constitutional difficulty.
The above sun·ey of legal problems may perhaps be sufficient to
suggest the difficulty and uncertainty with which the courts labored
in executing these measures of confiscation. It is often the case
with mooted points of law that the period of the greatest diversity
of opinion is also the period when the number of ca~es involved is
greatest, and when therefore the pressure upon the j uclicial authorities is heaviest. In the case of these legal difficulties regarding
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confiscation their final settlement did not occur until after the war;
in some cases so long afterward that the issue was practically dead,
and little benefit could be secured from the decisions as guides to
the lower tribunals. vVhen during the war we find doubt on such
fundamental points as the constitutionality of the law itself, and
the question as to whether a rebel could be heard in his own defense,
we need no longer wonder that judicial action in these cases was so
often unsatisfactory. \\'hen in addition to this we remember that
during the war both Congress and the courts did their work under
heavy pressure, and sometimes in haste and confusion, we can
better understand such mistakes and shortcomings as appear in
connection with the execution of the confiscation policy. To carry
out a war measure by peaceful process is a rather anomalous undertaking, yet this is what the strict judicial enforcement of the confiscation policy amounted to. \\'e must remember, too, that these
measures were exceptional, that they could be justified only on
extreme grounds. and that they touched human nature in a very
weak place.

VIJl.

FORFEITURES u;-;DER THE DIRECT TAX LEVY

As clo:,ely related to the general subject of judicial forfeiture
we may include within our study a form of seizure which practically amounted to confiscation, though carried out under legal
forms quite different from those of the confiscation acts. \Ve refer
to seizures based upon an act of June 7, 1862,·,9 "for the collection
of direct taxes in insurrectionary districts ,dthin the United States".
An earlier statute, that of August 5, 1861,60 providing for a direct
tax to secure war rerenue, had apportioned quotas to all the states,
including those in insurrection. It was now enacted that in those
states or districts where this act could not be peaceably executed,
special tax commissioners should be appointed by the President
who, as soon as the military authority of the United States could
be established, should make assessments "upon all the lands and
lots of ground"' situated in the insurrectionary territory. This
assessment was to be based upon the real estate valuation in force
in 1861. A penalty of fifty percent of the tax proper was made
an additional charge upon these lands. Upon default of the owners
to pay the tax, the land was to be forfeited to the United States,
and the commissioners in that case were to conduct public "tax
sales", selling to the highest bidder, or bidding in the property for
the lJnited States. The tax sale certificate of the commissioners
was to be sufficient to conyey a title in fee simple to the land, free
from all encumbrances.
Commissioners were appointed in accordance with this statute
for each of the eleven insurrectionary states. It was not possible,
of course, for the act to be carried out uniformly throughout the
South. Only in those districts where the Union forces maintained
some foothold could these tax sales be conducted. The following
table indicates the extent of this partial enforcement of the law:
•·• Stat. at Large, XII., 422.
' Ibid, 294 foJI.
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l'ROCE1ms oF SALES

av

UNITED STATES

TAx

CoMMiss10NERs

FOR No:-.-PAYMEXT or THE DIRECT
OF AUGUST

5, 1861.61

TAx

\'irginia .................. $113,130.57
South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . 370,000.00
Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64,705.87
Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48,067.24
Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101,970.52
The Union government could hardly ha\'e devised a measure
more odious to the people of the South. The levy of a federal tax
directly upon particular plots of ground in regions where ideas of
states· rights were so strong as in the Southern states was particularly distasteful, and the fact that this method was not adopted
in the :'•forth made the partiality of the measure the more apparent.
The tax collector of the enemy's government was thus brought into
immediate relations with the helpless citizens of those portions of
the South which fell into Union possession, and this unfortunate
situation naturally awakened the deepest resentment. Objection
was made that in view of the added penalty of fifty percent, requi red only in the insurrectionary states, the tax was not proportionately le,·ied, and was therefore unconstitutional. In dealing with
this objection the Supreme Court held that the fifty percent penalty
was no part of the tax, but was a fine "for default of voluntary
payment in clue time". The validity of the tax under the con~titution was therefore upheld.
\'arious objections ,,ere also urged again,t the special features
of the act by which it differed from ordinary provisions for tax
sales. A \'aluahle estate, for instance, would be sold to pay a trifling
tax, and the surplus over and above the tax. instead of being pai:I
to the owner. as in the usual tax sale, was turned into the United
States treasury. Moreo,·er the customary privilege of redemption
which belongs to the dispossessed owner in the ordinary tax sale,
was denied. Whatever this sort of proceeding might be calle·I, it
i~ clear that its effect was confiscation. ln some case, commissioners
required the O\\ ners lo pa) the tax in person, which was often an
impossibility. The question wa~ significant!) raised whether these
"Co11g. Olobc, 42 Cong., 2 sc~"·• p. 3387.
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extraordinary discriminations were consistent with the constitution,
and whether such a form of procedure could be called "due process
of law". Even granting that the federal government had any
claims to sovereignty in the South which would justify the levying
of a tax upon them during the rebellion, it is difficult to see how
these sweeping forfeitures can be defended on the ground of "tax
sales".
The most notable instance of seizure under the direct tax legislation was the case of the famous Arlington estate in Virginia, belonging to General Robert E. Lee.a: A tax amounting to $92.07
was levied upon this estate, and in September, 1863, the whole
property was sold for its non-payment. The tax commissioners
bid in part of the estate for the federal government at $26,800. For
other portions of the estate there were various other purchasers.
The grounds acquired by the government were made into a national
cemetery for the graves of Union soldiers.
After the death of Mrs. Robert E. Lee, her son, G. W. P. C.
Lee, claiming to have rnlid title to Arlington, petitioned Congress
to vote compensation to him in return for which he would yield all
his rights in the property and avoid litigation for its recovery. 83
He based his claim on the ground that the sale of the property by
the commissioners amounted to confiscation, and could not be held
valid. The extraordinary measures adopted to enforce the tax were,
he argued, unconstitutional. Instead of the sale of only so much
of the property as was necessary to pay the tax with interest and
penalties, the whole estate was forfeited to the United States and
sold. In this case the amount of the tax had actually been offered
by Mrs. Lee through her agent, but the commissioners had refused
to accept such payment, and the petitioner declared that this refusal rendered the whole proceeding rnid. Further, it was urged,
that the United States could not in justice secure more than a life
interest, and that the national legislature could not acquire jurisdiction over this estate without the consent of Virginia. This
petition was referred to the Committee on Judiciary, and was not
heard of further.&4
2
• J. K. Hosmer refers to the seizure of Arlington as If It were a cnKE' under
the C'on!lscatlon Act ltKelf. As a matter oC tnct, no process of confiscation, as
such, was undertnk!'n. Hosmer, Appeal to Arms, (Am. Nation, vol. 20), p. 172.
"'Sen. .llisc. Doc. 43 Cong., 1 sess., No. 96.
"Cong. Record, 43 Cong., 1 SCRS., vol II., pt. 3, p. 2812.
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The next phase of this case was a suit brought first in the United
States circuit court in Alexandria, Virginia, and later appealed to
the Supreme Court, in which the title of the United States under
the tax sale certificate was contested. The decision in the case of
lJnited States 1·. Lee is long and technical.65 The lower court hail
declared Lee's title valid, and this decision was affirmed. The arguments of the court, however, did not attack the validity of this
general class of tax sales; it was rather the conduct of these particular commissioners which was denounced. In spite of the principle that the United States cannot be sued without its consent
it was held that action could properly be brought against person,
whose acts as agents of the United States might interfere in an
unwarranted way with individual property rights. Since in this
case the commissioners had established the rule that owners must
pay the tax in person, payment was thus made impossible in the
majority of cases, and where the amount of the tax had been tendered through an agent and refused, no proceedings could be legally
begun which depended upon the voluntary default of the owner
to pay the tax. Any tax sale certificate secured under such regulations was therefore held to be invalid.
In view of this decision an appropriation became necessary in
order to establish the title of the United States to the Arlington
cemetery.66 The matter was finally settled by the payment of
$150,000 as compensation to the Lee heirs, in return for which
a release of all claims against the property was secured.67
The direct tax seizures in South Carolina illustrate further the
inequalities which were inherent in this form of proceeding.68 The
operations of the tax commissioners were confined to a few parishes
in the eastern portion of the state, but assessments were based upon
a uniform apportionment of the quota throughout the whole state.
The total quota for South Carolina was $363,570.66. The commi:--sioners collected $210,789.32 as taxes, and $28,232 as proceeds of
sales for non-payment of the direct tax. Besides this, considerable
profit was securecl to the goYernment by the disposition of such
property as was bid in for the United States by the commissioners
,. JOG l.'. !-<. 196.

"Cong. R!cOrtl, 41 Cong., 2 ses,;., vol. xiv, pt. 3, p. 2680.
., March 3, 1883. U. S. Stlltutes, 47 Cong., 2 ~ess., ch. HI, p. 684: Co11q.
Record, 47 Cong., 2 ~ess., vol. xiv, pt. 4, p. 3661.
" Hou Re Doc. 4 5 Cong., 3 ~e~s., no. 1 Ol.
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at the tax sales instead of being sold to private purchasers. Part
of such property was held by the government and rented; part was
sold to loyal citizens; part was purchased by soldiers, and part was
sold to heads of families. The proceeds of these various transactions, added to the amount actually collected as taxes, or secured
from original sales for non-payment, yielded an approximate sum
of $512,338, which exceeded the original quota of the whole state
by $148,768. It will thus be seen that though the tax was enforced
in only a portion of the state, yet the total proceeds derived by the
government from all the various transactions connected with the
collection of the tax were far in excess of the state's full quota. It
might ,,ell be claimed, therefore, that a doul,le inequality was involved; a portion of the citizens were made to pay while others went
free, and the state as a whole was bearing more than its proportionate share of the ''tax".
There was, moreover, in the case of two parishes, those of St.
Luke's and St. Helena, a still further hanlship.69 Ilcre there was
a general failure of the owners to appear and pay the tax, and the
commissioners disposed of a large quantity of land at public auction
at a very low price. ~lost of this land was not acquired by pri\'ate
parties, but was bid in for the government by the commissioners,
and later the property was sold to the former owners for amounts
greatly in excess of the sums at which the commissioners had bid
in the property for the United States. In one case a lot bid in at
$100 was later resold to its former owner for $2,600. Judge Nott
of the Court of Claims characterized this dh·estiture of property as
"exceedingly pitiable". and attributed such a policy to the "har:-her
judgments of the war".
These, we may remark, are effects of the direct tax which have
been generally overlooked, since the chief attention of the national
Congress has been given to the hea,y share of the tax sustained by
the "loyal" states as compared with the "insurrectionary" states.
\\'ith these larger phases of the question which have become a
matter of familiar history, we arc not at pre~ent concerned, since
the subject comes under our notice not as a tax, but as involving
an unequal and oppressive kind of forfeiture which amounted to
virtual confiscation.
"'1101111c Doc, 46 Cong,, 3 seas., no. 101, p. 2.
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Although various attempts were made to secure legislation adjusting the many inequalities which resulted from the direct tax
of the Civil \Var, nothing was clone along this line until March 2,
1891, when an act was passed prO\'iding for a refunding of the
amounts paid by the several states and territories under the direct
tax of August 5. 1861.10 So far as restitution was possible for the
forfeitures of which we have been speaking in this chapter, they were
provided in this act. Special provision was made for compensating those who lost their lands in South Carolina, and a general
repayment was provided for the benefit of all owner<; in any state,
whose lands had been bid in and sold under the provisions for
collecting this tax. Jurisdiction was given to the Court of Claims
over cases arising under these proyisions for restitution, and its
decisions were fairly liberal, but such tardy restorations could, of
course, only partially undo the effect of the original forfeitures. 71
•• 26 Stat. at Large, 822.

"The tollowlng are exam11les or ~uch decisions: Chaplln v. U. S., Ct. Cl.
Rep. 29, p. 231; Glo\'er et al. v. U. S. Ibid, p. 23G; Means v. U. S. Ct. Cl. Rep.
31, p. 245; Hogarth 11. U. S. Ct. Cl. Rep. 30, p. 346.

IX. CAPTURED AND ABANDONED PROPERTY

,vE have so far been confining our attention to cases of confiscation by judicial action. It should be remembered, however. that the
two specific laws of confiscation, providing for the judicial seizure
of "rebel" property in federal courts, formed only an ineffective
part of a larger policy of i•irtual confiscation which contemplated
the employment of an elaborate machinery for appropriating the
goods of the enemy. In the previous section on the direct tax we
noticed one important form of virtual confiscation, and \Ye now
turn to another and more sweeping system of appropriating property which was non-judicial in character.
The confiscation acts invoh eel the prosecution of suits in federal
district courts. and this was obviously impossible in insurrectionary
districts where no such courts were in operation, and where peaceful
judicial process was impracticable, even though the Union forces
might be in occupation of the territory. It was to be expected,
howewr, that as the federal armies advanced they would make capturec; of large amounts of private property, especially cotton, and
that there would be left in their train estates and miscellaneous
property which had been abandoned by the owners. Much of this
property would necessarily be of such a nature that the military
authorities could not dispose of it. and unless some action were
taken it would be left without ownership. It was also thought
desirable to encourage the capture of some of the staple products
of the South, not for direct military use, but as a means of reducing the enemy's resources, and adding to the resources of the
Union government.
To meet this situation Congress pao;sed. ~1 arch 12, 1863. the act
relating to ··capture,] and abandoned property".72 Under this law
the Secretary of the Treasury was to appoint special agents to collect
property of this kind in the insurrectionary territory. The agents
were to have nothing to do with property used for waging war,
"Statutes at Large, XII., 820. According to an opinion submitted to the
Treasury Department by Attorney-General Speed, July 5, 1865, property hostilely seized by the military authorities on land was to be regarded as "captured", while the term "abandoned'" was held to apply to property "whose owner
shall be voluntarily absent and engaged In, aiding, or encouraging, the rebellion·•. Sen. Doc. 40 Cong., 2 sess., no. 22; U. S. v. Padelford, 9 Wallace f>31.
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such as arms, ordnance, ships, etc., nor were they to have any authority over maritime prizes. The property thus collected was
either to be devoted to public use on due appraisement and certificate, or to be forwarded to some place of sale in a loyal state,
and the proceeds turned into the treasury. Provision was made in
the law for restoration to loyal owners after the war.
This act of Congress was essentially an exercise of the belligerent
right of confiscation, in a form different from that of the confiscation acts, and applying to property which the latter could not touch.
The competence belonged to Congress, according to the Supreme
Court, to provide for the forfeiture of the property of all persons
within the Confederacy, loyal as well as disloyal, on the principle
that all inhabitants of enemy territory are enemies.73 This, however, would have been an extreme measure, and the restoration of
the property of loyal citizens was therefore provided for, but in
doing so, Congress was renouncing a part of its strict belligerent
rights as the Supreme Court understood them. 71
The Treasury Department proceeded vigorously in carrying out
the provisions of this law, and soon developed an elaborate administrative machinery for collecting and marketing captured property.i5 A general agent was given charge of the ,,·hole work, under
whom was placed a large corps of supervising agents and local
agents, who ·were in turn assisted by "agency aids", and customs
officers specially designated for this work by the Secretary of the
Treasury.
This army of treasury officials which was thus set upon the
trail of captured property in the South did not find their chase a
holiday pastime.76 Even though within the Union lines, they found
"Young v. U. S., 97 U. S. 3nG; U. S. v. Vi'inchester, 99 U. S. 372, at p. 375.
11 Briggs v. U, S., 143 U. S. 346, at p. 356.
"Secretary Fessenden's Circular of Instructions concerning commercial
lntercou,·Re, and captured and abandoned property, July 29, 1864. The first
stages or the woric of enforcing the Captured Property Act are dJscu~sed In
Finance Repo1·t 1863, pp. 23-24.
1 • A general description of the methods used in collecting captured property
Is to be found In Secretary McCulloch's report, Nov. 8, 1866, House Flx. Doc.
39 Cong., 2 sess., no. 97. •ro secure unpublished material concerning the operations or the treasury officials, search has been made in the flies of the Miscellaneous Division or the Treasury Department, where the records concerning
captured property are deposited. Here much testimony, more or less reliable,
is to be found in the form or affidm·its. financial certificates, and official
reports. This material is the chief source of the data upon which this section
Is based.

C,\PTURl·:D .\NI> AB,\l\OO~ED l'ROPf(RTY

41

that they were in the enemy's country, and that the inhabitants ha<l
either deserted or were hostile to the removal of property. Cases
of personal injury to the officials were frequent enough to render
the work highly dangerous. ?.larks and other evidences of the
character and ownership of the cotton were often destroyed, and
cotton was often hauled to the woods or swamps and concealed in
advance of the agent's arrival. or in cases where this was impossible, it was frequently burned. Agents of the Confederate government were at the same time abroad through the South collecting
cotton, and this complicated the work of the Union officials, while
it increa,etl the tendency to e,·asion on the part of priYate owners.77
?-,: a tu rally much of the cotton so collected was in unfit condition, and
needed overhauling and rebaling before being placed on the market.
Above this difficulty, there still remained the clanger of secret raids
upon the government depots. resulting in the theft or demolition of
the cotton. or perhaps the substitution of an inferior grade for that
contained in the government store. Sales were required to be ronducted in the loyal states. but a serious obstacle to this plan was the
lack of sufficient means of transportation. l',:aturally the chief concern of the quartermasters in the field was the forwarding of supplies to the army. and they showed little zeal in co-operating with
the treasury agents for the removal of captured property.
Because of the perilous character of this work of bringing in
property from the insurrectionary districts, the government offered
large inducements to private individuals who would undergo the
necessary risks. Treasury officials offered to pay 25 percent of the
proceeds to any who would bale up and bring in cotton and deliver
it to the agent at one of the shipping ports. This fonn of contract
did not authorize purchases within the Confederate lines.i~ A
"It 1~ well known thnt consldernble cotton wnR burned h}· the Confederate
authorltlci> to prnent It from falling Into the hands of the Union government.
Among th•• Confederate cotton records, In chargo ot the Miscellaneous Division
or the 'l'rC'nsury Urpartmcnt, Is n book containing the names of persons who
hnd made claims on the Confederate trenRury for cotton destroyed by their
own force~. among wbom was President Jctr:erson DaV!s who made claim tor
two hundred baleH burned. The following are published documents dealing
with th!~ general subject: Report ot A. Roane, Chief of Confederate Produce
Loan Ottl<'e, House Misc. Doc. 40 Cong., 1 ~ess., no. 190, p. 39; Report of DeBow, G1mera1 Confederate Cotton Agent, ll>id; Treas. Dept. Circular, Jan. 9,
1900, no. 4. See also account of the facts In Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 2 'WalInce ms.
"Ho113e E:t:. Doc. 39 Cong., 2 sess., no. 97, p. 3: U. S. v. Lane, 8 Wallace 185.
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peculiar kind of executive permit, however, was issued by President
Lincoln which authorized the holder. even over the protest of the
military authorities, to pass through the lines and seize property in
the insurrectionary districts, the licensee being allowed to keep
three-fourths of the proceeds.i9 After Lincoln's death, some of the
licensees were deprived of the property, and the proceeds were put
into the treasury. The Supreme Court decided that the President
had no power to make these contracts, since they were in Yiolation
of the non-intercourse acts.~0 \\'herever purchases were made beyond the lines of military occupation of the federal forces they
were outlawed. Later, however, Congress by a special act came
to the relief of claimants who were thus dispossessed.
As might be expected, this system of collecting property produced many irregularities and cases of fraud. Individuals under
contract to collect and deliver cotton to a Union agent would often
seize property which they had no right to touch, or would collect
heavy bales of good quality and turn over to the government light
bales of poor quality. Residents in some cases represented themselves as agents for the Union government, and simply robbed under
this pretended authority, not condescending to show by what right
they made their seizures. Agents themselves blundered at times
because of a misunderstanding of their duties, or committed outrages in deliberate dishonesty. The unscrupulous agent, of course,
had exceptional opportunities for gain. In the process of repacking,
large quantities of cotton might be abstracted and disposed of at
private sale. False reports might be submitted, thus concealing the
true amount received. Immediate supervision might be evaded by
the pretext of direct orders from Washington to dispose of the
cotton in some other way than through the office of the next superior
agent. In certain districts, military authorities were implicated in
defrauding the goYernment, and in such a situation, lawless bands
of thieves were encouraged while good citizens were intimidated.
Considering these difficulties, the Captured Property Act was
extensively enforced. As reported officially in i\Iay, 1868, the gross
proceeds from the sale of cotton were $29,518.041, and the gross
,. Report of House Com. on Judiciary, House llcports, 45 Cong., 3 sess., no.
83. In the ca~e of U. S. 1,•. 129 Packages, 27 Fed. Cas. 284, such a. permit was
used fraudulently to ship whiskey Into a Union camp.
,. Ouachita Cotton Case, 6 \Yallace, 521 ; McKee v. U. S., 8 \Ynllace 163.
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proceeds from miscellaneous property, $1,309,650. The net total
of captured and abandoned property was $25,257,931.81
It will be seen that over ninety-five percent of the property
handled by the treasury agents was cotton. It is not hard to understand why this important commodity was so eagerly sought by the
Union authorities. Being the greatest staple product of the South,
it was regarded as their most valuable source of wealth, and was
held to contribute so directly to the support of the rebellion that it
should not be regarded in the same light as ordinary private property. It was declared by the Supreme Court to be a proper subject
for capture by the Union authorities during the Civil War, and not
to be protected by the general rule of international law which condemns the seizure of private property on land.82
"Sen. Ex. Doc. 4 0 Cong., 2 sess., no. 56, p. 52.

•• Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 2 ·wanace 404; Briggs v. U. S., 143 U. S. 346, 357;
Whitfield v. U. S. 92 U. S. 165. In the last case the court declared that cotton
was "during the late war, as much hostile property as the military supplies
and munitions It was used to obtain".

X. THE ADMINISTRATION OF ABANDONED ESTATES
TH1~ control of deserted houses and plantations was one of the
important problems involved in the execution of the Captured and
Abandoned Property Act. Property whose owner was absent in
aid of the insurrection was legally regarded as "abandoned", and
\\'as given O\'er to the jurisdiction of the Treasury Department.1!3
No attempt was made to disturb the title to this deserted property,
some of which, in sipte of the legal definition, was understood to
belong to loyal owners; it was merely held under the temporary
control of the Union officials, ready to be returned to its owners
after the war in the event of their loyalty being proved, or to be
confiscated if owned by a "rebel". The property was ordinarily put
in the hands of tenants who engaged to cultivate it, but in some
cases, especially in towns, it was appropriated to the relief of needy
applicants who could show both poverty and loyalty.
The machinery for administering these abandoned estates, as
illu,;tratecl by the ca~e of Louisiana."4 involved a plantation bureau
at "£\'ew Orleans, in charge of a ''Superintendent of Plantations"
under whom \\as placed a corps of agents and inspectors whose
functi ,n it \\ as to keep the central office in touch with the large
number of lessees and occupants to whom the estates were leased
or granted. The rents and proceeds derived from this period of
temporary control were appropriated by the government, and turned
in as a part of the captured and abandoned property "fund".
The disturbance of the ordinary conditions of life which is
incidental to warfare, was nowhere more strikingly revealed than in
connection with this system of operating deserted plantations.
I\eglect of improvements, dilapidation of buildings. and deterioration due to inexperienced farming were e\·erywhere evident. The
lessee's intere,;t naturally extended only to the harvesting of the im"Stat. at Large, XIT, S20, ~ec. 1; XIII, 376.

•• The r·ecordij or thl'~e transaction~ are deposited In the archives of the
Treasury Department at ·washlngton, In charge ot the Miscellaneous Division.
The following titles will Indicate the nature of this unpublished material: List
of Plantations transferred to the Treasury Department, third agency, by S. B.
Holab:rd, Col. and Chief Quartermaster, Dept. of Gulf, Oct. 1, 1863; Plantation
Inventories, Bk. no. 74; Plantation Bureau Records, containing Inspectors'
report~, Bk. no. 72.
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mediate crop, and this object was furthered in disregard of the permanent up-keep of the property. Several plantations might at times
be in control of one individual or firm and this led to the transfer
and indiscriminate mixture of movable property which should have
been localized in particular estates. The negroes, suddenly shifted
to a free status and to a system of lax discipline, became unruly and
faithless to contract. Offers of higher wages or easier work would
readily seduce them from one plantation to another and such a
departure of laborers might occasion the loss of a whole crop.
Trouble arose also because of the "hands" claiming the right to
plant cotton or anything else in their respective patches regardless
of the requirements of the overseers. All of these difficulties of
management were enhanced by the military authorities who caused
constant annoyance by deporting mules without compensation,
issuing full rations to idle negroes, and enrolling the "hands" as
"contraband troops". It sometimes happened that a plantation might
be occupied for months as a camp or a recruiting station, making
successful cultivation impossible.

It is clear that this whole system, in its essential features,
amounted to temporary confiscation. The government based its
claim to the proceeds of "captured" property and the revenue from
deserted property during the period of its abandonment, upon the
owner's disloyalty. In the measures adopted after the war, however, the hardships caused by confiscation in its various forms were
considerably mitigated, and this was especially true of the seizures
made under the Captured Property Act. Seizure in these cases did
not involve final condemnation, since the statute itself contemplated
relief to all "loyal" claimants who would, within two years after
the close of the war, prove their right before the Court of Claims.
In addition, the executive policy of unconditional pardon and general amnesty adopted after the war, removed finally all distinction
between "loyal" and "disloyal" owners, and required the restoration, so far as practicable, of all forfeited property rights.

XI. THE RESTORATION OF PROPERTY
II', treating the question of restorations as affecting forfeited
property certain incidental methods will be briefly examined, and
then the work of the Court of Claims will be somewhat more fully
considered.'• Both during and after the war we find that direct
u It will perhnps be ln order to give at this point a brief explanation ot the
errect ot pardon upon confiscated property. The first pardon proclamation or
Pr.,~ldent Lincoln, aud the first three ot President Johnson contained various
exceptions and conditions, among which were provisions that confiscated property should not be returned. Finally, however, a proclamation or December 26,
1868, declared an unconditional pardon without the requirement of a.n oath,
and without reservation as to forfeited property rights. So far as the executive policy Is concerned, there seems to have been no very definite program
touching the errect or pardon upon proceedings and Judgments under the Conflscal!on Act~. Attorney-General Speed' s first official utterance on the subject,
Issued !n the form or Instructions to district attorneys In May, 1865, directed the
discontinuance of confiscation proceedings, but these orders were later revoked,
and district attorneys were directed to press cases forward to an early determination. In the order of President Johnson regarding the re-establ!shment of tbe
authority of the United States !n Virginia a!ter the close of tbe war, we find
the following: "The Attorney-General will Instruct the proper officials to libel
and bring to Judgment, confiscation, and sale, property subject to confiscation, and
enforce the administration of Justice within said stat&''. In accordance with
tbls order, Speed directed District Attorney Cbandler to see that the appropriate
officials were Instructed to perform their duties as the President dlrectec1. Letter
Books of the Department of Justice, 1866 and 1866; Exec. Order, May 9, 1866,
0/fto. Rec., third series, V, p. H. The problem was ultimately disposed of by
the Supreme Court In a series of decisions. As regards the first confiscation
act the question was decided In 1867 In the case ot Armstrong's Foundry, 6
Wallace 766, where the court held that the sta.tute regarded the owner's consent to the hostile use of the property as an orrense ot which confiscation was
the penalty, hence pardon would restore to the claimant that portion of the
proceeds which went to the government, no opinion being expressed as to the
Informer's share. A dUl'erent and somewhat confusing line or Interpretation
was followed In the case or the act of 1862, for here the court declared that
not even universal amnesty could restore the lost property rights. The court
argued that the second conflscation act was passed In exercise of belligerent
rights, not for the punishment of treason, hence pardon ot the traitor could
not relieve him of the forfeiture. It was further maintained that property
which hod been sold to a purchaser In good faith and tor value could not be
Interfered with, and that the proceeds deposited In the treasury were beyond
the reach of judicial action, since Congress alone has power to reapproprlate
money covered Into the trensun•. Semmes ti. U. S., 91 U. S. 27 ; Knote t1. U. s.•
95 U. S. 149. The Judicial Interpretation of the two acts 1~. In fact, somewhat puzzllng, and It does not appear that any broad underlying principles
were consistently adhered to. In the case of the act of 1861 the whole title ln
rec was held to be surrendered on lhe ground tha.t the proceeding was merely
against the property, but the pardoned owner was as we have Just seen entitled
to that share or the proceeds which went to the government. In seizures under
the act of 1862 the lite Interest only was forfeited, thus at least partly recognlzln~ the confiscation as a penalty for a criminal otrense, but no reco,·ery could
be secured by reason ot pardon. Moreover, In the very brief opinion In the
case of Annstrong•s Foundry nothing Is said about the exclusive right of
Congress to control the appropriation of money from the treasury, though In
the case of Knote ti. United States, this was made one oc the chief grounds for
reCu81ng restoration.
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methods of relea~e were followed which disregarded, in some
measure, the statutory jurisdiction of the Court of Claims over these
cases. Quartermasters at times released property secured by military seizure before it had passed to the treasury officials. The
Secretary of the Treasury, who was continually beset with appeals
concerning erroneous seizures, exercised regularly during the war
the judicial function of allowing releases if convinced of the bo11a
fide character of the applicants.sg This policy he continued for
some months after the war, until, by an opinion of the AttorneyGeneral, the::-e cases were all referred to the Court of Claims.
,\nother important agency concerned in the restoration of prorerty was the !Jureau of Refugee:-. Freedmen and Abandoned
Lands. This institution was created by Congress, :\larch 3, 1865,
to provide protection and support for emancipated negroes, and to
it control of confiscated, captured, and abandoned real property was
entrusted.'; Estates which had been administered on a lease system
by treasury agents were placed in charge of the bureau as was
also propert) seized for judicial confiscation but not actually condemned, and a miscellaneous class of property in the hands of military authorities at the close of the ,, ar. The original intention was
that deserted lands should be allotted in small holdings to indi' idual freedmen, and, in South Carolina and Georgia, some land
was actually assigned. In general, however, the bureau either used
its land for colonies of freedmen, or continued the lease system in
order to make its property productive of revenue.
At first the bureau adopted a cautious policy regarding restorations, and c.leclinecl all applications not supported by proof of past
as well as present loyalty. By I 'resident Johnson's order in August,
1865, howeYer, the bureau was instrnctecl to return the property
of all who were included in the partial amnesty proclamations of
that year, or who, if excluded from these proclamations, could show
certificates of special pardon. As a result of these instructions,
the bureau was compelled to part with the greater portion of the
property once under its control. and the plan of allotment to freedmen was defeated because of the uncertainty of tenure applying
.. The uctuul adJudlcnlion or these clulms rested In tact with the local agent:
that Is, be would send In the paper8 with his recommendation Cor the Secretarr·s action. Report or Sec. McCulloch, Sen. Ex. Doc. 40 Cong., 2 se~s., no. 22.
"Stat. at Large, XIII, 507.
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to the bureau's holdings. A report of Commissioner Howard shows
that the officers of the bureau restored 15,452 acres of land seized
under the second confiscation act; 14,652 acres received as abandoned and allotted to freedmen, and 400,000 acres of abandoned
property which had never been allotted. Thus the total restorations amounted to 430,104 acres. 88
"After President Johnson's order the rules followed by the bureau in connection with these restorations were that land should not be regarded as confiscated until condemned and sold by a federal court; that property not properly
considered abandoned or confiscated should be surrendered to claimants; that
property be restored to pardoned "rebels", and that restoration of land under
cultivation be conditioned upon the payment by the claimant of an amount
sufficient to compensate Joyal refugees for their labor In worltlng the lands.
For the action of the Freedmen's Bureau regarding property see: General
Order, War Dept. no. 110, Offic. Rec. third series, V, 51 ; Reports of Gen'! 0. 0.
Howard, Com'r, House 'Ex. Doc. 39 Cong., 1 sess., no. 11; Ho1.u1e Jfisc. Doc. 38
Cong., 1 sess., no. 78; Hottse Ex. Doc. 39 Cong., 1 sess., no. 19; Ibid, no. 99;
Peirce, The Freedmen's Bttreatt, 21, 22, 24.

XII. RESTORATIONS BY TIIE COl'RT OF CLAIMS
The incidental methods of restoring property noted in the foregoing section, were all subordinate to the work of the Court of Claims
-the regularly designated tribunal for adjudicating cases of captured and abandoned property, and the only agency by which the
grounds of release were subjected to a strictly judicial determination. In c!c:aling with these cases the Court of Claims followed,
not too rigidly. the terms of the Yarious statutes involved,89 and
introduced certain rules of its own making. The claimant was
required to show that he was the owner of the property claimed and
that he had never given aid or comfort to the rebellion. The government was not to be loaded with the burden of proving disloyalty.
Voluntary residence in an insurrectionary district was taken as
prima facic evidence of a rebellious character, and this must be rebutted by satisfactory testimony covering the whole period of the
war, and showing that no act of sympathy to the Con federate movement had been willingly perfonned.
The Court of Claims thus became the tribunal for judging the
facts as to the conduct of thom:ands of professed Unionists in the
South, and its hearings assumed somewhat the character of a
judgment clay proceeding, where, after the deeds of all had been
laid bare. the faithful were rewarded and the rebellious turned
away. The voluminous testimony which the court examined constitutes perahaps the best body of material rc,ealing in detail the
conduct of "loyal" Southerners, and for the historian who takes up
the study of the Civil War loyalists it will have somewhat the same
•• The followlng provision tor the reclamntlon ot property was Included In
the Cnptured and .AIJnndoned Property Act: "Any person claiming to have been
the owner ot any such captured or abandoned property may, at n.ny time
within two years after the Huppresslon or the rebellion, prefer hill claim to the
proceeds thereof In the Court of Clnlms; and, on proof to the sattefactton of
sald Court of his ownership of said property, of his right to the proceeds
ther,•of, and that he has ne\'er given any aid or comfort to the present rebel•
lion, may receive the residue of such proceeds after the deduction of any purchase money which may have been paid, together wlth tho expense ot transportation ancl sale of such 1iroperty and any other lawful expense>< attending
the dl8posltlon thereof". Stat. at Laroe, XII, 820, Sec. 3. By a further enactmt>nl of July 27, J SGS, the remedy thus given was declared to be exclusive,
precluding the claimant from "sult at common law, or any other mode of
redress whatever". Ibid. XV, 243, St·c. 3.
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value as the papers of the New York royal commission had for
the study of the corresponding topic in the Revolutionary \Var. 90
Men and women of Union sympathies, as this testimony shows,
were scattered in considerable number throughout the South. Surrounded as they were by a repressing and persecuting majority.
they naturally found it difficult to express their loyalty in any
active, organized form. They had to be content, therefore, with a
negative attitude, a sort of "passive resistance", refusing to take
any voluntary measures against the government at \Vashington,
and performing individual acts of friendship to the Union cause.
\Ve find them resisting the Confederate draft, carrying provisions
and medicine to the Union soldiers, contributing funds for helping
the "blue-coats", attending the boys in the hospitals. and in other
equally mild ways promoting the Union cause.
This "loyalty", which meant simply treason from the standpoint of southern communities and neighborhoods. naturally incurred local persecution, and the Unionist of the South moved constantly in an atmosphere of scorn and prejudice, and was continually
disturbed by threats of personal violence. Furthermore, he was
often compelled against his will to give some support to the southern
cause. It was an exceptional Unionist indeed who was not pressed
into the conscript lines, or compelled to subscribe to a Confederate
loan, or forced to labor on entrenchments, and in addition to all
this he must of course pay taxes into the "rebel" treasury, howe\'er loud might be his protest. Children eYen caught up the national
feud. and the refusal of one daring youth to give up the Stars and
Stripes for the neighbor boys to spit upon resulted in a se,·ere
laceration, and later in a fatal blow from a brick-bat.
In conducting these suits. the Court of Claims found its docket
well crowded. The total amount paid out in judgments in such
cases up to February 4, 1888. was reported as $9.864,300.75.91
\Vhen we remember that the sums involved in each case were
usually small, and that these figures represent only the claims
•• Testimony of the ~ort here referred to may be found In
lished reports or cases: at. of Cls. Re1Jts: nr, 19, 177, 218,
Y, 412, 586, 706.
"'l'reas. Dept. Circular, Jan. 9, 1900, no. 4. For a list
dered by the Court of Claims between March, 1863, and
Flouse Misc. Doc. 40 Cong., 1 sess., no. 500, pp. 2-9.

the following pub240, 390; IV. 337;
of judgments renMarch, 18 67, see:
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which were allowed, we can form an idea of the vast amount of
this litigation which the court handled.
The most critical point of law touching these claims related
to the effect of pardon and amnesty action of the President upon
the rights of claimants for property seized during the war. Were
disloyal owners permanently divested of their property by that proviso of the Captured Property Act which required proof that the
owner had "never given any aid or comfort to the present rebellion", or could the consequences of disloyalty be avoided by the
President's proclamation of pardon and amnesty, and the owner's
acceptance of the oath of allegiance? This question was presented
in the case of United States v. Klein, appealed from the Court of
Claims to the Supreme Court.92 The most liberal view of the case
was sustained by the latter tribunal. In main substance the opinion
was that Congress had intended to restore property not only to loyal
owners, but to those who had been hostile and might later become
loyal; that after the proclamation of general amnesty the restoration of property to all bona fide owners claiming under the Captured Property Act became the duty of the government, and that
such restoration became the "absolute right of the persons pardoned", the government having constituted itself the trustee, not
only for claimants protected by the original act, but for all who
might later be recognized as entitled to their property. "'Pardon
and restoration of political rights'", declared the court, "were in
return for the oath and its fulfillment. To refuse it would be a
breach of faith not less cruel and astounding than to abandon the
freed people whom the executive had promised to maintain in
their freedom".
After this decision of the Supreme Court, therefore, all claimants who had been dispossessed through the operation of the Captured Property Act were, regardless of loyalty, entitled to restoration. There was, however, another proviso in the original act which
more seriously affected the claimants' prospects of recovery. The
suits must, according to the law, be brought within two years "after
the suppression of the rebellion". The claim, for instance, in the
case of United States v. Anderson was preferred June 5, 1868.P3
•• 13 Wallace 168.
similar.
" 9 Wallace 56.

'£he decision In U. S.

11.

Padeltord, 9 ~·anace, 531, ts
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Could this be construed as having been presented within the prescribed limit? Here the court was called upon to fix the exact
date when, in the strict legal sense, the rebellion ceased. Again a
liberal construction was adopted. The court held that Congress
could not be supposed to have left possible claimants to decide this
matter for themselves, and that, in lieu of a formal treaty of peace
which in the case of a foreign war serves to mark the exact point
at which the legal relations peculiar to war cease, there must be
some public act or legislation which will serve to fix definitely such
a point. The elate of President Johnson's proclamation, August 20,
1866, in which for the first time the entire suppression of the
rebellion throughout the country was declared, was taken by the
court as marking the legal termination of the war. It was pointed
out that on 11arch 2, 1867, Congress, referring to an act of June
20, 1864, regarding the pay of non-commissioned officers and
privates, had continued the act in force for three years "from and
after the close of the rebellion, as announced by the proclamation
of the President, August 20, 1866". This date had therefore been
declared by the executive and legislative departments to be the
termination of the rebellion, and the court declared that it must
therefore be so applied with reference to the rights intended to be
secured by the Captured Property Act.
Unfortunately for the claimants, the decision in the Klein case
did not come until 1869, after the period had expired during which,
according to the declaration of the Supreme Court in the Anderson
case, the recoYery of property was possible. It thus appeared that
there were many claimants to whom, as a matter of equity, Congress owed relief, while at the same time it was alleged that a
considerable sum, variously reported but supposed to be well over
ten million dollars, remained as a part of the captured property or
cotton "fund" after the necessary deductions were made. For this
reason agitation was begun to secure relief for those claimants
who, under the very natural misapprehension that they would be
required to prove loyalty, had allowed the two years' limitation to
lapse without taking advantage of their right to plead before the
Court of Claims. Various bills to revive in favor of such claimants the right of action before the Court of Claims have been presented to Congress. and the House Committee on Judiciary has at
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various times reported favorably on such legislation, but no action
has yet been taken.94 Meanwhile curious suggestions have been
made regarding the disposition of this "fund", such as dividing it
among the states or devoting it to the relief of ex-Confederate
soldiers, but these proposals, like the proposed bills and committee
reports, have been lost in the general oblivion of the Congressional
calendar.

In general the various reports and proposals presented on this
complicated subject are inconsistent. The number of claimants
whose right of action was debarred has doubtless been greatly exaggerated, while a careful analysis shows that the figures and
assertions regarding the so-called "fund" in the treasury are misleading. In the report of the House Committee on Judiciary, submitted to the first session of the fifty-second Congress, we find a
statistical exhibit which shows $31.722,466.20 as the "whole amount
of the sales from captured and abandoned property", and after the
deduction of such items as cost of collecting, amounts transferred
or released, or amounts paid out of the "fund" on judgments or
special acts of release, a balance of $10,512,007.96 is shown as the
amount remaining from the captured property "fund".95
By reference, however, to the report of the Register of the
Treasury, February 4, 1888, it appears that the net receipts from
captured and abandoned property were $26,887,584.39. Not all of
this. however, was secured from the sale of privately owned cotton. 96
A sum exceeding six million dollars included under this heading
was derived from the purchase of cotton by the treasury officials,
the cotton later being sold for gold, thus involving a double profit
owing to the premium on gold. Receipts from miscellaneous property, rents, and from the sale of captured vessels were also classed
in this same fund. A deduction of these various items leaves
$15,880,664.19, as the receipts from the sale of individual cotton.
One very important item in this last total, however, was a
sum amounting to $4,886,671 received from the sale of cotton captured after June 30, 1865, nearly all of which was Confederate,
•• Cong. Globe, 62 Cong., 1 sess., House Bills 173, 455, 2764, 5451; Ibid.
vol. 29, House B!II 7618 ; House Reports, 60 Cong., 1 sess., no. 646, serial 2600;
Ibid, 51 Cong., 1 sess., no. 784, serial 2809; Ibid, 52 Cong., 1 sess., no. 1377.
"House Revort, 52 Cong., 1 sess., no. 1377.
"Treas. Dept. Clrcular, Jan. 9, 1900, no. 4.
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not private, cotton. To understand the nature of this item it must
be explained that seizures under the Captured and Abandoned Property Act did not cease at the close of war. Besides the collection
of private property the treasury officials had been constantly active
in seizing the property of the Confederate government. 97 :Much
of this property was in the hands of private holders scattered through
the insurrectionary states, and the treasury agents continued their
collections of this sort of property during 1865. After the spring
of 1865 the seizures of the Treasury Department were chiefly confined to property which had been sold to the Confederate government, or to one of the Confederate states. or subscribed to the
"produce loan" of the Confederacy, or delivered as military supplies to the Confederate army.
In collecting this property of the Confederate government, much
difficulty was experienced in avoiding the seizure of purely private
property. Agents would often take cotton held in private possession on suspicion that it belonged to the Confederate States. Tf
mistakes were discovered, the property was usually released to the
owner at once without requiring proofs of loyalty. Sometimes
rather loose methods were used in the collection of "C. S. cotton"
after the war. 1fr. X would come to the agent and say, "I know
where some C. S. cotton is", and the agent would engage to give
him a portion if he would bring it in. X would then get any cotton
he could lay his hands on and deliYer it over to the agent.!lll In this
and similar ways. there was indiscriminate seizure of private property with that which had belonged to the Confederacy, but on the
whole considerable caution seems to have been exercised by the
Treasury Department.99 To aid them in avoiding erroneous seizure
of private cotton, agents had access to lists which had been kept
by "rebel" cotton agents, showing where and in whose possession
., Jlousc Ex. Doc. 39 Cong., 2 sess.. no. 97.

•• In some lnstnnces ot this sort as high as 75 per cent. of the proceeds
was to be pa Id to the person undertaking the risk of collecting the cotton. The
records or B. F. Flanders, Supervising Special Agent of the Treaaury Department at New Orleans contains numerous such Instances. These records are
filed with the Miscellaneous Divli-lon of the Treasury Department.
"Jn Secretary :.rcCulloch's printed circular ot Instructions, Oct. 20, 186;;,
agents were warned to use g reat care In collecting property belonging to the
Confederate government, or subscribed to the produce loan, "to the end that the
rights of Individuals be not Interfered with, or the property of unotrendlng
persons taken from them".
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C. S. A. cotton was to be found. Another valuable source of evidence was to be had in the county tax lists from which all public
(Confederate) cotton was excluded as not subject to taxation, and
on which none but private cotton was entered.100
If now we recur to the above-mentioned fifteen millions actually
received from individual cotton, and deduct the various disbursements which must be charged against this sum, such as expenses,
amounts allowed by the Secretary of the Treasury on claims,
amounts paid on judgments of the Court of Claims, or allowed by
private acts of Congress, there remains a balance of $4,992,349.92.101
This amount, it will be noticed, is substantially equal to the proceeds
of the sale of cotton which belonged to the Confederacy. Hence it
is maintained by the Treasury Department that no such "fund" as
that mentioned in the House Committee's report exists, and that
the balance now in the treasury represents not the value of cotton
due to individuals whose claims have been debarred, but the amot1nt
receiYcd from Confederate cotton which the United States is under
no just or equitable obligation to return.
These war claims are still being constantly urge<l. \Vhen presented directly to the Court of Claims they are declared outlawed
by the two-year limitation. If they appear in the form of private
petitions to Congress for equitable relief, they are ultimately referred to the Treasury Department for recommendation, and the
department maintains a set of clerks whose whole time is given to
examining the genuineness of such claims. In this rather unsatisfactory shape the question rests today, with an exaggerated impression abroad as to the number of owners dispossessed. and with a
misapprehension, even on the part of Congressmen, as to the existence of a "fund" for their relief.
Affidavit or ·wm. A. McCann, Dec. 12, 1865, Cotton mul Captw·ed Pro11c,·ty
Files of the Treas. Dept.
101 Treas. Dept. Circular, Jan. 9, 1900, no. 4.
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UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL
For the subject of confiscation and captured property the unpublished material, though voluminous, is for the most part difficult of
access, and unsuitably arranged for purposes of historical investigation. The records of the various district courts of the United
States form an important and authentic source of information, and
are usually well preserved, except where some accident has caused
their destruction, as in the case of the Chicago fire of 1871. The
entries, however, in the docket books, where a convenient chronological arrangement is preserved, are not always definite enough to
distinguish sharply the various kinds of seizure, and a more laborious
examination of the court files becomes necessary. Among these
papers are contained the original records of every proceeding connected with the trial: the libel, the plaintiff's answer, a copy of the
monition, the rarious depositions and affidavits. the writ of ·'vendi",
the marshal's return of sale, the certificate of the court's final
process with the written opinion, perhaps, of the judge, and whatever petitions for appeal or restoration may have been submitted
after the condemnation of the property.
The records of the Attorney-General's office for the period of
the Civil \Var are disappointing. No systematic series of reports
was kept which would afford a comprehensive notion of the extent
of the enforcement of the Confiscation Acts throughout the country.
Communication between this office and the various district attorneys
and marshals was incidental and casual rather than regular, while
the more important portions of the correspondence with the other
executive departments have been published in the series of congressional documents. The material, moreover. is loosely arranged and
poorly housed, and much of it ( e. g., the letters received), is entirely
without index. There is enough here, however. to reveal the problems encountered in the enforcement of the acts, the methods of
evasion and interference resorted to, and the nature of the instructions, usually not very satisfactory, which were sent out from \Vashington.
The voluminous records touching "captured and abandoned
property" are deposited in the office of the Miscellaneous Division
of the Treasury Department. This varied mass of material occupies
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~e, eral ~cores of cubic feet, ancl contains letter books and reports
of treasury agents, papers collected in the adjudication of "cotton
claims'", plantation records, reports of inspectors, etc. In this office
there is also deposited a considerable mass of Confederate records
touching the sequestration of property, the "cotton loan", and the
Yarious transactions of the Con federate treasury. Some of these
records were captured, and some were purchased. A large part
of this material has been recently indexed by the card system, and
is still being constantly used for securing data relating to various
kinds of ""·ar claims". Like much of the go, crnment's records, howewr. it is poorly housed and almost inaccessible for purposes of
historical im·estigation. For an effective use of the material found
in the Treasury Department a considerable amount of discrimination
is necessary. EYen in the case of treasury warrants, which are
presumably the most accurate and definite of documents, it is in
~ome cases necessary to "go behind the face of the return", for instances are not wanting in which these warrants have stated incorrectly the source from which money has been derived.
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so-called "fund", 53, 55. S1·e also
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